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South Africans emerged from the darkness and entered the into the 
light of freedom in 1994 when the first democratic elections where 
held in South Africa. This liberty was entrenched with the signing of 
the Constitution in December 1996 by President Nelson Mandela at 
Sharpeville. Taxpayers have also benefitted under the Constitution. 
This dissertation examines the Constitution and how it applies to 
taxpayers and their rights. I t examines the legislation which 
regulates the tax authorities and how they apply this legislation. I t 
then examines the rights of taxpayers and how the Constitutional 
Court interprets the Constitution in respect of taxpayers rights. 
The dissertation also examines the remedies that taxpayers have 
when they feel that their rights have been encroached upon. The 
correct order that should be followed by taxpayers in protecting 
their rights is discussed. Recent proposals announced by the tax 
authorities, in an attempt to assist taxpayers, are examined. 
Finally, common law and practical problems that face taxpayers are 
discussed and thereafter a short conclusion is drawn as to the rights 
of taxpayers. 
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1.1 Purpose of this study 
The purpose of this study is to review the changes that have taken place 
within the Revenue authorities. Specific sections of the Income Tax Act, the 
Value Added Tax Act and the Customs and Excise Act will be reviewed. It will 
examine how the Revenue authorities interpret and administer these sections 
in accordance with the stated objectives of SARS. Next, the role that the 
Constitution and Constitutional Court plays in the rights of the taxpayer will be 
examined. It will seek to understand the underlying spirit of the Constitution, 
and examine the sections of the Constitution that apply to the administration 
of the abovementioned three acts. The study will then briefly survey the 
mechanics of the Constitutional Court. Constitutional Court cases will be 
reviewed with particular insight into whom has brought constitutional 
challenges, their nature and the outcome. Then practical issues facing the 
taxpayer will be considered together with the rights, remedies and avenues of 
action that are available to the taxpayer. 
1.2 Background 
Although behind the scene discussions, negotiations and meetings had been 
taking place for some years, the re-entry of South Africa into the international 
community only began to become a possibility with the unbanning of the 
African National Congress and the unconditional release of Nelson Mandela 
from prison. This was announced by President FW De Klerk in 1990. As soon 
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as this had been accomplished, preparations for the New South Africa began 
in earnest, culminating with the first multi-party democratic elections in 1994. 
In order to prevent the legislative discrimination and abuse of power that had 
characterized the previous regime, the Constitutional Court was established in 
1994 as the highest court in the land. The Interim Constitution came into 
operation on 27 April 1994. A Bill of Rights was entrenched in the Constitution 
to ensure that the rights, as enshrined therein, of all the citizens of South 
Africa, be protected. Mahomed DP, in dealing with the vision of the Interim 
constitution stated in Shabalala and Others v Attorney-General, Transvaal, 
and Another CCT 23/94 on page 20 that: 
" There is a stark and dramatic contrast between the past in which South 
Africans were trapped and the future on which the Constitution is premised. 
The past was pervaded by inequality, authoritarianism and repression. The 
aspiration of the future is based on what is 'justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on freedom and equality'. It is premised on a legal 
culture of accountability and transparency. The relevant provisions of the 
Constitution must therefore be interpreted so as to give effect to the purposes 
sought to be advanced by their enactment." 
According to the South African Yearbook 2002/3 the South African 
constitution is one of the most progressive in the world and enjoys high 
acclaim internationally. A bright new future had dawned for the people of 
South Africa. None so more than for taxpayer's rights under the 1996 
Constitution. 
1.3 Key Fiscal Policies 
With the election of the African National Congress as the Government in 1994 
significant changes were inevitable as it faced many challenges. In Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution - A Macro-Economic Strategy publication key 
fiscal goals of the ANC government that were identified were : 
2 
• the reduction of the overall budget deficit, 
• the level of government spending, and 
• the avoidance of permanent increases in the overall tax burden. 
The tax system played an important role in government's fiscal stabilization 
programme. Efficient revenue collection and the closing of the tax gap were 
vital to the government's endeavour to achieve its policy goals. 
1.4 Inland Revenue 
In 1996 Inland Revenue changed its name to the South African Revenue 
Service and thereafter commenced a complete overhaul of itself (Taxgram 
Issue No 4 April 1996). The objective of this was to modernize technologies, 
motivate staff and become more efficient and user friendly with the end result 
of generating greater income by expanding the tax base and exploiting 
previously untapped sources. 
The first significant legislation to be introduced was the change to residence-
based tax, in 1999, which was necessitated by the re-introduction of South 
Africa into the international community. Capital Gains Tax was to follow in 
2001 and to a lesser extent the subjection of directors of Companies and 
members of Close Corporations to PAYE in 2002 and amendments to the 
Transfer Duty Act in 2003. In 2004 the Alternate Dispute Resolution process 
was introduced. 
Operationally, SARS upgraded its operating systems with the assistance of 
new-found friends overseas with most tasks becoming computerized. 
According to P Webb, in her article "Kissed by an angel" on page 31 of the 
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May 2003 issue of Accountancy SA, this upgrading resulted in SARS, 
possessing technology considerably more sophisticated than that used in 
Britain. With the introduction of e-filing (Taxgram March 2003), taxpayers had 
the opportunity of carrying out a number of transactions with SARS such as 
submission of VAT and PAYE returns (PWC Enhancing tax compliance Sept 
2002) as well as submission of applications for and obtaining extensions and 
directives. A process of training and upgrading of personnel skills was, and 
continued to be, undertaken as was a process of integration of previously 
disadvantaged groups. Offices were completely overhauled and in some cases 
replaced. The Siyakha project was also instituted. The operational 
organization of SARS was reconfigured and divided into three separate 
operating divisions, namely call centres, processing and compliance. 
In 2003 the Taxpayer Service Charter was adopted (Taxgram February 2003) 
and Customs and Excise was merged into SARS. These changes will be 
discussed in greater depth in Chapter2. 
So much for the liberalization of the Constitution and the transformation of 
SARS and tax legislation. How has this affected the taxpayer and his new 




The South African Revenue Service 
2.1 Introduction 
Since the change of government in 1994 significant changes have taken place 
within Inland Revenue. This has had important implications for the taxpayer. 
2.2 The Transformation of the South African Revenue 
Service 
In October 1995 (Taxgram Issue No 4 April 1996) the Cabinet approved the 
reform of Inland Revenue and Customs and Excise in the Department of 
Finance into an autonomous revenue service to be known as the South 
African Revenue Service (SARS) under a Board of Directors. The Cabinet had 
indicated that the required degree of autonomy and flexibility should be 
sought within the disciplines and control of the Public Service and SARS would 
be funded by a percentage of revenue collections. SARS came into operation 
on 1 April 1996. At the launch the then Minister of Finance, Chris Liebenberg 
is quoted on page 3 of the April 1996 issue of Taxgram as saying: 
" The launch of the new service provides a unique opportunity for revenue 
collection in South to shake off its past and move towards a new era of 
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efficient and effective tax collection." 
Piet Liebenberg, former chief executive officer of the Council of Southern 
African Bankers, was appointed the chief executive from 1 June 1996. 
2.2.1 Tax reform 
Tax reform took place in two distinct phases: 
2.2.1.1 Phase 1 
Investigations undertaken and reports produced by the Katz Commission of 
Enquiry into Certain Aspects of the Tax Structure of South Africa were the first 
phase of reform. 
According to page 87 of Kolitz & Arendse's article" A reflection : Tax reform 
in South Africa", the Commission's terms of reference were: 
* to inquire into the appropriateness and efficiency of the present tax system 
and make recommendations on its improvement, taking into account 
internationally accepted tax principles and practices." 
This was accomplished between 1994 and 1999 and resulted in many tax 
amendments. The second phase of reform dealt with amending the tax 
system to conform with the international community 
2.2.1.l.a The Katz Commission 
The Katz Commission made, among others, the following recommendations 
• the elimination of discriminatory provisions that contravened the 
Constitution. As a result, gender discrimination was removed from the 
Income Tax Act in 1995. 
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• an investigation of incentives for small businesses, recognizing the 
importance of promoting this sector of the economy so as to achieve 
the objectives of growth and development. On 1 April 2000 a 
preferential tax rate was introduced for qualifying small business as 
was a special allowance, allowing a 100% write-off of manufacturing 
plant and machinery brought into use by the qualifying small business 
on or after 1 April 2001. 
• retirement funds and savings. In its First Interim Report the 
Commission recommended that the tax-exempt status of pension funds 
should be reviewed. The Tax on Retirement Funds Act 38 of 1996 
introduced tax on the gross interest and net rentals of retirement 
funds. The initial rate was 17% but was increased to 25% in 1998 and 
reduced to 18% in 2003. 
• tax-exempt organizations. Almost the entire focus of the Ninth Report 
of the Commission was on tax-exempt organizations. A complete 
revamp of legislation covering religious, charitable, welfare and similar 
organizations was undertaken and implemented in 2000 with the 
introduction of public benefit organizations. 
2.2.1.2 Phase 2 
The second phase of reform dealt mainly with the broadening of the tax base 
and amending of the tax system to conform with international norms. A major 
part of the tax reform process was the restructuring of the Directorates of 
Inland Revenue and Customs and Excise into an autonomous collection 
agency known as the South African Revenue Service under the leadership of 
the Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service. This enabled the 
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SARS to implement the organizational changes and recruit the staff necessary 
to make substantial improvements in revenue collections. The Internal 
Corruption Investigation Unit was formed in May 1999 to deal with allegations 
of fraud and corruption perpetrated by SARS staff members (SA Revenue 
Service: Zero Fraud, Zero Corruption). 
"SARS has invested in human resources and has attracted top-class 
professionals such as lawyers and chartered accountants." 
So says the Commissioner's spokesman S Nkosi on page 11 of the February 
2004 issue of'You' magazine. 
In his 2004 Budget Speech Finance Minister Trevor Manuel explained that 
between 1996 and 2000 SARS managed to collect more than R 20 billion in 
excess of its budgets. Furthermore, in the 2003 tax year alone the amount 
collected in excess of the budget was R 13 billion. 
In June 1998 SARS launched the national transformation programme. From 
this emanated a comprehensive, detailed internal and external assessment 
and planning process and this eventually resulted in the Siyakha project. 
2.2.2 The Siyakha project 
Siyakha is a Zulu word meaning " we are building". According to an article 
prepared by SARS on pages 4-5 of the April 2004 magazine "The Accountant" 
this was in line with the stated intention of government to build an open 
democracy. 
The Siyakha concept was presented to the Minister of Finance and the 
Cabinet during the latter half of 2000. At this time the first signs of the strong 
nominal revenue growth, averaging 13% a year, were becoming evident. 
This was largely due to the administrative autonomy the founding SARS Act 
established and the fact that the organizational composition was beginning to 
8 
be reformed into a modern and efficient revenue and customs authority. 
However, SARS management remained convinced that there existed a 
burning need for change in the organization since SARS was still performing 
significantly below what was considered to be its full potential. The Siyakha 
initiative, which was the primary transformation tool to organization 
efficiency, has become the most radical and ambitious change strategy in the 
history of revenue collection in South Africa by introducing a new service 
culture, structural change in management and cutting-edge new technologies. 
In presenting Siyakha to Cabinet, SARS outlined as its key objectives, the 
commitment to establish targeted enforcement program based on risk-
profiling, to integrate border management, to leverage developments in 
technology for electronic transactions, to improve inspections and 
enforcement, to enhance human resource and infrastructure capability and, 
as a front-line point of interaction with the public, to implement a customer-
centric view that supports speedy resolution. The increased use of technology 
required of SARS to automate, streamline and standardize processes and to 
establish electronic data storage and file retrievals. The aim was to reduce 
turnaround times substantially, to eliminate the "silo effect" by treating 
taxpayers as holistic entities in respect of different tax types and to improve 
quality and accuracy of services and assessments to the public. 
The conduct of SARS in recent years has, however, produced some responses 
which appear not to reflect the image that was aimed at. For example: 
P Webb writes on page 31 of the May 2003 issue of Accountancy SA: 
"... the South African Revenue Service appears to be enjoying more success 
in arresting those accused of tax fraud and other white collar crimes such as 
smuggling. Lets hope that, on conviction, the Courts impose salutary 
sentences and that the accused do not benefit from Solon's law; Solon, 
you remember, was a Greek philosopher who said that laws are like a 
spider's web. The weak are caught while the strong escape." 
C Divaris, writing on page 144 of Tax Planning vol 17 No 6 about his own 
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experience as a tax consultant says: 
w...in more recent years, and before a more sober yet still relatively 
impoverished audience, I endeavoured to keep people out of gaol... today I 
increasingly see myself as a human-rights activist, trying , albeit on a 
pathetically small scale, to protect the, again, relatively poor and weak from 
the mauling jaws of the terrible, destructive and ultimately futile machine that 
the current Commissioner has blindly and unwittingly created." 
2.3 Conclusion 
SARS has gone through a significant transformation process, which has been 
described above. With improved technology and trained specialist staff it is 
able to enter the realm of the privacy of people to a much greater degree. E 
Louw writes on pages 10 and 11 of the February 2004 issue of 'You' 
magazine: 
"Thanks to computer technology, we're being watched like never before - and 
the dreaded Big Brother is the taxman ... It's enough to make you feel there's 
a tax agent skulking behind every comer, watching you through binoculars ... 
These people have the authority to stick their noses shamelessly in your 
business and go through your bank statements." 




The Power of SARS 
3.1 Introduction 
"The general public is largely unaware of the extraordinary powers available 
to the South African Revenue Service (SARS), and hopefully will never 
experience them first hand". 
So writes E Lai-King, a director of Werkmans Tax on page 14 of Executive 
Business Brief Vol 9 No 4. 
SARS obtains its authority and powers from the various Acts that it is 
entrusted with administering. These include, inter alia, The Income Tax Act, 
The Value Added Tax Act and The Customs and Excise Act. A plethora of 
similar sections within these Acts grants SARS its wide powers. The most 
relevant sections of the three Acts mentioned above will be reviewed before 
proceeding to examine in what manner these sections are administered. 
n 
3.2 The Income Tax Act 
3.2.1 Section 3 
"3. Exercise of powers and performance of duties. 
(1) The powers conferred and the duties imposed upon the Commissioner by 
or under the provisions of this Act or any amendment thereof may be 
exercised or performed by the Commissioner personally, or by any officer 
engaged in carrying out the said provisions under the control, direction or 
supervision of the Commissioner. 
(2) Any decision made by and any notice or communication issued or signed 
by any such officer concerned, shall for the purposes of the said provisions, 
until it has been so withdrawn, be deemed to have been made, issued or 
signed by the Commissioner : Provided that a decision made by any such 
officer in the exercise of any discretionary power under the provisions of this 
Act or any previous Income Tax Act shall not be withdrawn or amended after 
the expiration of three years from the date of the written notification of such 
decision or of the notice of assessment giving effect thereto, if all the material 
facts were known to the said officer when he made his decision. 
(3) Any written decision made by the Commissioner personally in the exercise 
of any discretionary power under the provisions of this Act or of any previous 
Income Tax Act shall not be withdrawn or amended by the Commissioner if all 
the material facts were known to him when he made his decision. 
(4) Any decision of the Commissioner under the definition of 'benefit fund', 
'pension fund', 'provident fund', 'retirement annuity fund', and 'spouse' in 
section 1, section 6, section 8(4)(b), (c), (d) and (e), section 9D, section 9E, 
section 10(l)(cH), (cK), (e), (iA), (j) and (nB), section 11(e), (f), (g), (gA), Q), 
(0/ (X), (u), and (w), section 12C, section 12E, section 12G, section 13, 
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section 14, section 15, section 22(1), (3), and (5), section 24(2), section 
24A(6), section 24C, section 24D, section 241, section 25D, section 27, section 
30, section 31, section 35(2), section 38(4), section 41(4), section 57, 
paragraphs 6, 7, 9, 13, 13A, 14, 19 and 20, of the First Schedule, paragraph 
(b) of the definition of 'formula A' in paragraph 1 and paragraph 4 of the 
Second Schedule, paragraphs 18, 19(1), 20, 21, 22, 24 and 27 of the Fourth 
schedule, paragraph 2, 3, 6, 9 and 11 of the Seventh Schedule and 
paragraphs 29(2A), 29(7), 31(2), 65(l)(d) and 66(l)(c) of the Eighth 
Schedule, shall be subject to objection and appeal." 
The Commissioner is empowered, by this section, to delegate his powers to 
his staff within SARS. This is a very important section of the Income Tax Act, 
particularly subsection 4 which notes which sections of the Income Tax Act 
are subject to the Commissioners discretion. Furthermore, delegation of 
powers constitutes 'conduct' as contemplated by section 2 of the Constitution 
and therefore these powers have to be exercised extremely carefully. This will 
be discussed more fully in 5.2.2. Furthermore, this section provides that, 
under certain circumstances, an exercise of discretion by the Commissioner 
may not be withdrawn or amended. It thus forces the taxpayer to have that 
exercise of discretion reviewed where he feels that the Commissioner has not, 
for example, applied his mind to all the facts or acted fairly. This will be 
discussed in 5.3.8 and also Chapter 9. 
3.2.2 Section 74A 
"74A. Furnishing of information, documents or things by any person. 
The Commissioner or any officer may, for the purposes of the administration 
of this Act in relation to any taxpayer, require such taxpayer or any other 
person to furnish such information (whether orally or in writing) documents or 
things as the Commissioner or such officer may require." 
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3.2.3 Section 74B 
"74B. Obtaining of information, documents or things at certain 
premises. 
(1) The Commissioner, or an officer named in an authorisation letter, may, for 
the purposes of the administration of this Act in relation to any taxpayer, 
require such taxpayer or any other person, with reasonable prior notice, to 
furnish, produce or make available any such information, documents or things 
as the Commissioner or such officer may require to inspect, audit, examine or 
obtain. 
(2) For the purposes of the inspection, audit, examination or obtaining of any 
such information, documents or things, the Commissioner or an officer 
contemplated in subsection (1), may call on any person : 
(a) at any premises; and 
(b) at any time during such person's normal business hours. 
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2), the Commissioner or any officer 
contemplated in subsection (1), shall not enter any dwelling-house or 
domestic premises (except any part thereof as may be occupied or used for 
the purposes to trade) without the consent of the occupant. 
(4) Any officer exercising any power under this section, shall on demand 
produce the authority letter issued to him." 
3.2.4 Section 74C 
"74C. Inquiry. 
(1) The Commissioner or an officer contemplated in section 74(4) may 
authorise any person to conduct an inquiry for the purposes of the 
administration of this Act. 
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(2) Where the Commissioner, or any officer contemplated in section 74(4), 
authorises a person to conduct an inquiry, the Commissioner or such officer 
shall apply to a judge for an order designating a presiding officer before 
whom the inquiry is to be held. 
(3) A judge may, on application by the Commissioner or any officer 
contemplated in section 74(4), grant an order in terms of which a person 
contemplated in subsection (7) is designated to act as presiding officer at the 
inquiry contemplated in this section. 
(4) An application under subsection (2) shall be supported by information 
supplied under oath or solemn declaration, establishing the facts on which the 
application is based. 
(5) A judge may grant the order referred to in subsection (3) if he is satisfied 
that there are reasonable grounds to believe that: 
(a) (i) there has been non-compliance by any person with his obligations in 
terms of the Act; or 
(ii) an offence in terms of this Act has been committed by any person; 
(b) information, documents or things are likely to be revealed which may 
afford proof of: 
(i) such non-compliance; or 
(ii) the committing of such an offence; and 
(c) the inquiry referred to in the application is likely to reveal such 
information, documents or things. 
(6) An order under subsection (3) shall, inter alia : 
(a) name the presiding officer; 
(b) refer to the alleged non-compliance or offence to be inquired into; 
(c) identify the person alleged to have failed to comply with the provisions of 
the Act or to have committed the offence; and 
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(d) be reasonably specific as to the ambit of the inquiry. 
(7) Any presiding officer shall be a person appointed by the Minister of 
Finance in terms of section 83A(4). 
(8) For the purposes of an inquiry contemplated in this section, a presiding 
officer designated under subsection (3) shall : 
(a) determine the proceedings as he may think fit; 
(b) have the same powers : 
(i) to enforce the attendance of witnesses and to compel them to give 
evidence or to produce evidential material; and 
(ii) relating to contempt committed during the proceedings, as are 
vested in a president of the Special Court contemplated in section 
83, and for those purposes section 84 and 85 shall apply mutatis 
mutandis; and 
(c) record the proceedings and evidence at an evidence at an inquiry in such 
manner as he may think fit. 
(9) Any person may, by written notice issued by the presiding officer, be 
required to appear before him in order to be questioned under oath or 
solemn declaration for the purposes of an inquiry contemplated in this 
section. 
(10) The notice contemplated in subsection (9) shall specify the : 
(a) place where such inquiry will be conducted; 
(b) date and time of such inquiry; and 
(c) reasons for such inquiry. 
(11)Any person whose affairs are investigated in the course of an inquiry 
contemplated in this section, shall be entitled to be present at the inquiry 
during such time as his affairs are investigated, unless on application by 
the person contemplated in subsection (1), the presiding officer directs 
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otherwise on the ground that the presence of the person and his 
representative, or either of them, would be prejudicial to the effective 
conduct of the inquiry. 
(12)Any person contemplated in subsection (9) has the right to have a legal 
representative present during the time that he appears before the 
presiding officer. 
(13)An inquiry contemplated in this section shall be private and confidential 
and the presiding officer shall at any time on application by the person 
whose affairs are investigated or any other person giving evidence or the 
person contemplated in subsection (1), exclude from such inquiry or 
require to withdraw therefrom, all or any persons whose attendance is 
not necessary for the inquiry. 
(14)Any person may, at the discretion of the presiding officer, be 
compensated for his reasonable expenditure related to the attendance of 
an inquiry, by way of witness fees in accordance with the tariffs 
prescribed in terms of section 51bis of the Magistrates' Courts Act, 1944 
(Act No. 32 of 1944). 
(15)The provisions with regard to the preservation of secrecy contained in 
section 4 shall mutatis mutandis apply to any person present at the 
questioning of any person contemplated in subsection (9), including the 
person being questioned. 
(16)Subject to subject (17), the evidence given under oath or solemn 
declaration at an inquiry may be used by the Commissioner in any 
subsequent proceedings to which the person whose affairs are 
investigated is a party or to which a person who had dealings with such 
person is a party. 
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(17)(a) No person may refuse to answer any question during an inquiry on 
the grounds that it may incriminate him. 
(b) No incriminating evidence so obtained shall be admissible in any 
criminal proceedings against the person giving such evidence, other 
than in proceedings where that person stands trial on a charge 
relating to the administering or taking of an oath or the administering 
or making of an affirmation or the giving of false evidence or the 
making of a false statement in connection with such questions and 
answers, or a failure to answer questions lawfully put to him, fully 
and satisfactorily. 
(18)As an inquiry in terms of this section shall proceed notwithstanding the 
fact that any civil or criminal proceedings are pending or contemplated 
against or involving any person contemplated in subsection (6)(c) or any 
witness or potential witness or any person whose affairs may be 
investigated in the course of such inquiry." 
3.2.5 Section 74D 
"74D. Search and Seizure. 
(1) For the purposes of the administration of this Act, a judge may, on 
application by the Commissioner or any officer contemplated in section 74(4), 
issue a warrant, authorising the officer named therein to, without prior notice 
and at any time : 
(a) (i) enter and search any premises; and 
(ii) search any person present on the premises, provided that such 
search is conducted by an officer of the same gender as the 
person being searched, for any information, documents or things, 
that may afford evidence as to the non-compliance by any 
taxpayer with his obligations in terms of this Act; 
(b) seize any such information, documents or things; and 
(c) in carrying out any such search, open or cause to be opened or removed 
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and opened, anything in which such officer suspects any information, 
documents or things to be contained. 
(2) An application under subsection (1) shall be supported by information 
supplied under oath or solemn declaration, establishing the facts on 
which the application is based. 
(3) A judge may issue the warrant referred to in subsection (1) if he is 
satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that: 
(a) (i) there has been non-compliance by any person with his 
obligations in terms of this Act; or 
(ii) an offence in terms of this Act has been committed by any 
person; 
(d) information, documents or things are likely to be found which may afford 
evidence of-
(i) such non-compliance; or 
(ii) the committing of such an offence; and 
(c) the premises specified in the application are likely to contain such 
information, documents or things. 
(4) A warrant issued under subsection (1) shall : 
(a) refer to the alleged non-compliance or offence in relation to which it is 
issued; 
(b) identify the premises to be searched; 
(c) identify the person alleged to have failed to comply with the provisions of 
the Act or to have committed the offence; and 
(d) be reasonably specific as to any information, documents or things to be 
searched for and seized. 
(5) Where the officer named in the warrant has reasonable grounds to 
believe that: 
(a) such information, documents or things are-
(i) at any premises not identified in such warrant; and 
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(ii) about to be removed or destroyed; and 
(b) a warrant cannot be obtained timeously to prevent such removal or 
destruction, such officer may search such premises and further exercise 
all the powers granted by this section, as if such premises had been 
identified in a warrant. 
(6) Any officer who executes a warrant may seize, in addition to 
the information, documents or things referred to in the warrant, any 
other information, documents or things that such officer believes on 
reasonable grounds afford evidence of the non-compliance with the 
relevant obligations or the committing of an offence in terms of this Act. 
(7) The officer exercising any power under this section shall on demand 
produce the relevant warrant (if any). 
(8) The Commissioner, who shall take reasonable care to ensure that the 
information, documents or things are preserved, may retain them until 
the conclusion of any investigation into the non-compliance or offence in 
relation to which the information, documents or things were seized or 
until they are required to be used for the purposes of any legal 
proceedings under this Act, whichever event occurs last. 
(9) 
(a) Any person may apply to the relevant division of the High Court for the 
return of any information, documents or things seized under this 
section. 
(b) The Court hearing such application may, on good cause shown, make 
such an order as it deems fit. 
(10) The person to whose affairs any information, documents or things 
seized under this section relate, may examine and make extracts 
therefrom and obtain one copy thereof at the expense of the State during 
normal business hours under such supervision as the Commissioner may 
determine." 
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These sections empower the Commissioner to carry out search and seizure 
operations, in some cases without prior notice. 
In Shelton v CSARS 64 SATC 179, the Commissioner applied, ex parte, for and 
was granted a warrant of search and seizure in relation to a businessman who 
was alleged to have failed to lodge tax returns for several years and to have 
made a false statement in relation to his personal assets and liabilities. The 
businessman's premises were searched thereafter by SARS officials, who 
seized certain documents. The businessman then applied to court for an order 
that the documents be returned to him on the grounds that the Commissioner 
ought to have given him notice that an application was to be made to a judge 
for the warrant of search and seizure, so that he could oppose the 
application. The Supreme Court of Appeal held that the warrant had been 
granted on the basis of allegations that the taxpayer had made false 
statements in his tax return in relation to his assets - in effect, that he had 
intentionally concealed the existence of assets from the tax authorities - and 
that in these circumstances it would have been self-defeating to have given 
the taxpayer advance notice of the application for a warrant of search and 
seizure. By implication, the court was saying that if it was true that the 
taxpayer had in the past deliberately concealed his assets from the tax 
authorities, then to give him prior warning of the search and seizure operation 
would have enabled him to take further steps to conceal assets or records of 
assets ahead of the raid on his premises. 
In these circumstances, said the court, the legislation allowed the tax 
authorities to apply to a judge for a warrant of search and seizure without 
notice to the taxpayer. 
The legislation also entitles them to conduct inquiries where the taxpayer may 
be subjected to interrogation under oath. The manner in which these are 
carried out has been the subject of more than a few approaches to the court 
for relief. The sections give the Commissioner widespread powers. However, 
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he has to be sure that, as much as the taxpayer must comply with tax 
regulations, he must comply with the provisions of the above sections read in 
conjunction with the provisions of the Constitution (PriceWaterouseCoopers 
Nov/Dec 2002). 
3.2.6 Section 88 
"88. Payment of tax pending appeal. 
(1) The obligation to pay and the right to receive and recover any tax 
chargeable under this Act shall not, unless the Commissioner so directs, be 
suspended by any appeal or pending the decision of a court of law under 
section 86A, but if any assessment is altered on appeal or in conformity with 
any such decision or a decision by the Commissioner to concede the appeal to 
the tax board or to the tax court or such court of law, a due adjustment shall 
be made, amounts paid in excess being refunded with interest at the 
prescribed rate, such interest being calculated from the date proved to the 
satisfaction of the Commissioner to be the date on which such excess was 
received and amounts short-paid being recoverable with interest calculated as 
provided in section 89. 
(2) The payment by the commissioner of any interest under the provisions of 
this section shall be deemed to be a drawback from revenue charged to the 
National Revenue Fund." 
J Silke, in an article on page 52 of Tax Planning Vol 15 No 3 entitled "Pay 
now, argue later - A valid principle" submits that if section 88 is directly 
challenged on a basis of its unconstitutionality, it is unlikely that the challenge 
would succeed for the reasons given in the Metcash Trading Limited v CSARS 
CCT 3/2000. It would be better to challenge the Commissioner's decision on 
fair and just administration. 
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3.2.7 Section 91(l)(b) 
"91 Recovery of tax 
(l)(b) If any person fails to pay any tax or any interest payable in terms of 
section 89(2) or 89quat when such tax or interest becomes due or is payable 
by him, the Commissioner may file with the clerk or registrar of any 
competent court a statement certified by him as correct and setting forth the 
amount of tax or interest so due or payable by that person, and such 
statement shall thereupon have all the effects of, and any proceedings may 
be taken thereon as if it were a civil judgement lawfully given in that court in 
favour of the Commissioner for a liquid debt of the amount specified in the 
statement." 
Section 91(l)(b) relates to the recovery of outstanding tax, interest and 
penalties. It empowers SARS to file, without the taxpayer being present or 
informed, a statement with any court certifying that income tax, interest and 
penalties are owing by the taxpayer, and such statement shall have the effect 
of a civil judgement in favour of SARS for the debt so specified. This section 
has been interpreted by taxpayers to mean that they have no access to a 
court against a statement filed by SARS and therefore should be ruled 
unconstitutional. As will be seen in 7.5 this is not so. 
3.2.8 Section 92 
"92. Correctness of assessment cannot be questioned. 
It shall not be competent for any person in any proceedings in connection 
with any statement filed in terms of paragraph (b) of subsection (1) of section 
91 to question the correctness of any assessment on which such statement is 
based, notwithstanding that objection and appeal may have been lodged 
thereto." 
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This is an important section of the Income Tax Act because it is often 
misunderstood. It is often interpreted to state that the taxpayer has no 
recourse available once the statement is filed by the Commissioner with the 
Court. However in Metcash Trading Limited v CSARS CCT 3/2000 which is 
examined in 7.13. the Court ruled differently. 
3.2.9 Section 99 
"99. Power to appoint an agent. 
The Commissioner may, if he thinks necessary, declare any person to be the 
agent of any other person, and the person so declared an agent shall be the 
agent for the purposes of this Act and may be required to make payment of 
any tax, interest or penalty due from any moneys, including pensions, salary, 
wages or any other remuneration, which may be held by him or due by him to 
the person whose agent he has been declared to be." 
It is Section 99 which empowers the Commissioner to appoint anybody, if he 
considers it necessary, to be an agent of SARS and to collect or withhold any 
amount that may be held by him or due by him to the person whose agent he 
has been declared to be. This could include the taxpayer's employer, bank 
manager or someone who has a contractual liability to the taxpayer. This 
section was the focus of the Mpande Foodliner CC v CSARS 63 SATC 46 which 
is examined in 9.4. 
3.3 The Value Added Tax Act 
3.3.1 Section 5 
The VAT equivalent of section 3 of the Income Tax Act. 
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3.3.2 Section 36 
The VAT equivalent of Income Tax section 88 this section gives effect to the 
"Pay Now, Argue Later" principle. 
3.3.3 Section 37 
Section 37 lays the burden of proof on the taxpayer in any proceedings to 
prove the correctness of VAT claimed or income exempt from VAT. 
3.3.4 Section 40(2)(a) 
The Commissioner is entitled under this section to file a statement before a 
court as he may in terms of Section 91 of the Income Tax Act. 
3.3.5 Section 40(5) 
This section is the VAT equivalent of the income tax section 92 in that it 
prevents the taxpayer from disputing the correctness of an assessment filed 
by the Commissioner with a Court in terms of Section 36. 
3.3.6 Section 47 
Section 47 is the equivalent of the Income Tax section 99 which empowers 
the Commissioner to appoint any person as an agent of SARS. 
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3.4 The Customs and Excise Act 
3.4.1 Section 3 
The Customs and excise equivalent of the Income Tax and VAT delegation 
sections. 
3.4.2 Section 4 
Section 4 of the Customs and Excise Act grants the Commissioner his search 
and seizure powers. This section is different from those corresponding 
sections of the Income Tax Act and the VAT Act in that the officials involved 
in the search and seizure may do so at any time and without any prior notice. 
Furthermore, they may, unaccompanied, at least during the day, use force in 
order to break into any premises, boat or vehicle. In Henbase 3392 (Pty) Ltd 
v CSARS 64 SATC 203 the taxpayer challenged the right by Customs and 
Excise officials to seize goods without a prior hearing and providing sufficient 
reasons. The taxpayer carried on a business as an importer, supplier and 
distributor to retailers of clothing, imported from Malawi. An agreement 
between South Africa and Malawi provided that there was no import duty on 
certain goods, including clothing manufactured in Malawi. This provision 
included a proviso that at least 25% of the cost of producing the imported 
goods would consist of material and labour performed in Malawi. At the 
border the customs officials required the taxpayer to make provisional 
payments in respect of the customs duty in respect of the clothing being 
imported. The taxpayer refused on the basis that the goods were exempt 
from customs duty in terms of the agreement between South Africa and 
Malawi. The customs officials thereafter detained the goods. The taxpayer 
was of the view that the customs officials had acted in an unfair, unjustifiable 
and unreasonable manner and approached the Court for an urgent order to 
release the goods. 
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The High Court agreed that the fact that the taxpayer had been given no 
hearing prior to the detention of the goods and no reasons had been 
advanced for such detention was unfair and infringed on his constitutional 
rights. However, it declined to grant the order as it was of the view that the 
goods had merely been detained and not seized or forfeited. Furthermore, it 
believed that it would be impracticable to demand a hearing before the goods 
were detained. This could make the particular section of the Act meaningless. 
The Court also found in its judgement that the Customs and Excise did not 
have unreasonable grounds for believing that the goods were not exempt 
from customs duty. On these bases, the infringement on the taxpayer's rights 
could be justified by the customs officials. 
3.4.3 Section 77G 
The "Pay Now, Argue Later" principle is given effect in this section. 
3.4.4 Section 114A 
Section 114A is the equivalent of the sections in the Income Tax Act and VAT 
Act empowering the Commissioner to appoint anybody as an agent. 
Taxpayers do not merely have to contend with the statutory provisions that 
give SARS its power to wield. A thorn in any tax planner's side is the common 
law principles that the Courts apply from time to time. This was particularly 
relevant in Erf 3183/1 Ladysmith (Pty) Ltd and Another v CIR 58 SATC 229 
and Relier (Pty) Ltd v CIR 60 SATC 1. According to Silke J in his article "Tax 
avoidance schemes", in both of these cases elaborate agreements were 
entered into by the parties involved. Harms JA, in Relier (Pty) Ltd v CIR 60 
SATC 1 on page 6 summarised the conclusions of Hefer JA in the Ladysmith 
case: 
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" In the main this court concluded that although the law permits people to 
arrange their affairs so as to remain outside the provisions of a particular 
statute, including a taxing provision, the question in the end remains whether 
the arrangement was one of substance and not one of form. More to the 
point, it was held that parties cannot arrange their affairs through or with the 
aid of simulated transactions and effect will be given to unexpressed 
agreements and tacit understandings." 
E Lai - King, a director of Werkmans Tax sums it up as follows on page 14 of 
Vol 9 No 4 Executive Business Brief: 
" The end result is that the Sheriff of the Court may arrive unannounced at 
your business and start attaching assets. It sounds like a nightmare, but it's 
happening in practice." 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The Conduct Of SARS 
4.1 Introduction 
"The Receiver has always been someone to be reckoned with but since Pravin 
Gordhan became Commissioner of the South African Revenue Service he's 
started a transformation process to close the gap between what taxpayers 
actually pay and what they should be paying." 
So writes E Louw on page 10 in her article entitled "You Can Run But You 
Can't Hide". 
The South African Revenue Service influences all of our lives, whether directly 
or indirectly. The manner in which it carries out its duties and the reasons for 
which the Commissioner applies the discretions afforded him has a bearing on 
whether they are entitled to or not. This chapter provides examples of the 
manner in which the South African Revenue Service applies some of its 
energies and how it affects taxpayers. 
4.2 Practical Examples 
The following are examples from an article in You magazine written by E. 
Louw of how SARS has accessed private information: 
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• Five friends had collected enough money by saving on the household 
budget here and selling the odd koeksuster there and putting away 
every last cent into a bank account. Finally the big day arrived as they 
went to the bank to draw the money in order to pay for air tickets for 
an overseas holiday. It was then, to their shock, that they discovered 
that all the money had been withdrawn by SARS as the person who 
held the bank account was not registered for Income Tax. According to 
their tax consultant, months later they are still battling to recover their 
money. 
• 'The Receiver of Revenue has become much more aggressive over the 
past two years ... he (SARS) sues easily, takes you to court and takes 
possession of your money or goods". So says a Gauteng tax 
consultant. 
• A well-known stripper believed she could get away with not declaring 
part of her income. To her shock she discovered a SARS employee had 
been keeping every single newspaper article and advertisement about 
her performances on file. 
• If you own a swanky car you could easily attract the attention of an 
SARS employee who jots down your registration number and, at the 
tap of a computer keyboard, discovers who you are and takes renewed 
interest in your tax returns. With the click of a computer mouse he can 
see what property you own and how much you paid for it. 
• Says a former auditor at SARS in the Eastern Cape: 
"With our technology it's easier than ever for the taxman to play Big 
Brother. From his computer he can go to municipal car registrations or 
the deeds office where properties are registered or to your bank 
account. He can even transfer money from your bank account to the 
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Receiver's account if you owe him money." 
"Money made from shares can no longer be hidden from the Receiver 
by hiding shares in a trust fund. The Receiver requires the ID number 
of the person in charge of such accounts. All the loopholes have now 
been closed" says a Johannesburg tax consultant. 
The taxman studies magazines and newspapers and notes the names 
of achievers such as "Businessman or Woman of the Year" or an 
insurance company's top marketers. This was confirmed by SARS 
acting on media reports of the apparent wealth of a well known 
businessman. SARS launched an investigation into his affairs and as a 
result issued additional assessments amounting to R 2 billion. It then 
obtained an interdict to attach his assets and launched an application 
to have his estate provisionally sequestrated. 
Should you get divorced and pay your ex-spouse a settlement of 
millions the Receiver will soon sit up and take note of whether there's 
any sign of those millions in your tax return. 
If he (SARS) discovers you own two homes but haven't declared any 
income from rent money he'll go through your monthly bank 
statements. 
In Gauteng, a rugby bugging scandal led to a probe being initiated by 
Revenue into the affairs of the Golden Lions Rugby Union. 
Every Monday morning, a Receiver of Revenue on the East Rand asked 
his staff to bring him the tax files of various taxpayers. He was a keen 
marathon runner and during long hours on the road, in training and in 
races, his fellow runners would unwittingly divulge damaging tax 
information. 
31 
• Commenting on the conduct of the Controller of Customs and/or his 
department in Deacon v Controller of Customs and Excise 61 SATC 275 
Horn AJ had the following to say on page 290: 
" In my view the respondent, when one has regard to the information which 
was at his disposal, acted in a manner reminiscent of the old order prior to 
the coming into operation of the Constitution. The respondent acted on the 
misplaced conviction that the applicant had no rights insofar as it concerned 
the motor vehicle and that the provisions of the Act, drastic as they are, took 
precedence, come what may. The respondent was impervious to the 
applicant's right to expect fair administrative procedure and his right to 
protection in terms of the Constitution. The manner in which the respondent 
dealt with this matter was particularly officious. The respondent acted without 
taking into account relevant factors and ignored the right of the applicant to 
be given full details of the respondent's findings and the opportunity to be 
heard." 
From the preceding list it can be seen that the range of the ear and the eye 
of SARS is ever increasing and has become more sensitive, and in some cases 
totally insensitive to taxpayers right's. SARS Commissioner Pravin Gordhan is 
quoted by the February issue of You magazine on page 10 as saying as 
follows: 
" Too many South Africans have Lamborghinis and Porches in the garage and 
own 10 properties yet claim their taxable income is less than R 100 000 a 
year." 
Is the South African Revenue Service allowed to act on assumptions such as 
the above without good reason ? Are there taxpayers' rights that can be 
infringed and what defence do taxpayers have for their rights ? 
In an article written in Tax Planning Vol 5 No 5 a few years ago, a senior 
lecturer at a local university had the following to say on page 141 about a 
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new income tax amendment: 
" Bullies, we were taught as children, were to be stood up and to punched 
firmly on the nose. Many people may see the latest amendment as a bullying 
manoeuvre on the part of Inland Revenue. Yet perhaps by adopting the 
lessons learnt as children and standing up to the new provisions, the force of 
the amendment might prove to be illusory." 
There have been a number of cases in the Constitutional Court which have 
laid challenge to the various sections of the three Acts referred to above. 
Metcash Trading Limited v CSARS CCT3/2000, in particular, drew considerable 
media attention as it was a challenge on the constitutionality of the "Pay Now, 
Argue Later" rule which, in terms of the Income Tax Act, the VAT Act and the 
Customs and Excise Act, requires taxpayers to pay any assessment issued by 
SARS before being able to challenge it before a court of law. The interest 
generated in the case was because of the enormous powers the "Pay Now, 
Argue Later" rule affords SARS. The case was referred to the Constitutional 
Court by the High Court to confirm its ruling that sections 36(1), 40(2)(a) and 
40(5) of the VAT Act were unconstitutional. 
This was subsequently declined by the Constitutional Court which stated that 
"the "Pay Now, Argue Later" action by SARS was not unconstitutional and that 
even if the taxpayer's right of access to a court of law was infringed, such 
infringement was justifiable and reasonable in an open and democratic 
society. 
However, all is not lost. An examination of this judgement, although delivered 
in favour of the Commissioner for SARS, points the taxpayer to the 
Constitution and ancillary legislation which can in certain circumstances aid 
the taxpayer. E Lai-King expresses it thus on page 16 of of Executive Business 
Brief: 
"Although it often seems like a David and Goliath type of struggle when the 
attention and awesome powers of SARS are trained on a taxpayer, there are 
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remedies available to even the odds." 
The very power of SARS can be a stumbling block to it as the scrutiny of the 
carrying out of these vast powers can expose the conduct of Revenue officials 
to a challenge in terms of the Bill of Rights as contained in the Constitution. A 
review of the Constitution and, more specifically, the Bill of Rights will show 
what rights arise therefrom. Moreover, decisions may be reviewed in terms of 
the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, 3 of 2000 (PAJA) and this does 
not require an appearance in the Constitutional Court but can dealt with by 





In 1997 the Taxation Committee of the South African Institute of Chartered 
Accountants published a memorandum of proposed taxpayer rights that they 
had put together with the hope that it would serve as a basis for an 
amendment or amendments to the (then) current tax legislation in the form 
of a Bill of Rights for taxpayers. Among others, the following proposals were 
suggested in the memorandum: 
• The right to be assisted and informed (in conformity with sections 23 and 
24 of the Constitution); 
• The right of appeal (section 24 of the Constitution); 
• The right to pay no more than the correct amount of tax; 
• The right to certainty; 
• The right to privacy (section 13 of the Constitution); 
• The right to confidentiality and secrecy (section 13 of the Constitution); 
• The right to assistance for the illiterate; 
• The right to communication; 
• The right to equality of treatment; 
• The institution of an independent office of an ombudsman; 
• The acknowledgement of receipt of all communication; 
• A system of advance rulings; 
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• The right to courtesy and consideration; 
• The right to request information; 
• The right to have counsel or an advisor present at all meetings; 
• The right to have reasons for tax imposed or deductions disallowed; 
• The right to fair objection and appeal procedures; 
• The right to have prompt finalisation of their tax affairs; 
Certain of these proposals have been legislated recently, such as the 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) procedure and the PAJA. The SARS 
Service Monitoring Office was a step in the right direction to an office of an 
independent ombudsman. However, the SARS Service Monitoring Office is not 
completely independent, being part of the SARS structure. 
There has always been provision for others, such as the objection and appeal 
procedures. However, the idea of an actual Bill of Rights for taxpayers, 
unfortunately, seems to have fallen on deaf ears as nothing resembling the 
memorandum has seen the light of day, save for the Client Service Charter 
appearing on the back of certain income tax returns. The taxpayer is still 
forced to resort to reliance on legislation such as the Bill of Rights and other 
sections of the Constitution, as well as the PAJA for relief from the draconian 
powers granted by the tax legislation. 
An example to consider would be that of the United States where the 
taxpayer's rights have been legislated in a separate Act. This Act, the 
Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2 (Public Law 104 - 168) Act was promulgated 
relatively recently, on 30 July 1996. It created the Office of the Taxpayer 
Advocate and provided for increased taxpayer protection by assisting 
taxpayers in resolving administrative problems with the Internal Revenue 
Service. In terms of this Act the Taxpayer Advocate is required to identify 
potential problems in tax legislation and recommend appropriate changes that 
would avoid disputes between the Internal Revenue Service. He is 
furthermore required to report to Congress on an annual basis as to the work 
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carried out by his office and the results of complaints lodged with it. 
This chapter deals with the Constitution and gives a brief overview of the 
sections of the Constitution which have an impact on the rights of taxpayers 
and the duty of the Commissioner and SARS officials. These sections will be 
referred to in later chapters that discuss avenues that may be open to 
beleaguered taxpayers as well as chapter 7 that discusses relevant decided 
cases. 
5.2 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 
108 of 1996 
5 .2 .1 Introduction 
The Constitution was approved by the Constitutional Court on 4 December 
1996. It was signed by then President Nelson Mandela in Sharpeville, Gauteng 
on 10 December 1996 and became effective on 4 February 1997. It is divided 
into 34 chapters and subdivided into sections. 
5.2.2 Supremacy of Constitution 
Section 2 of the Constitution reads as follows: 
"This Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct 
inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be 
fulfilled." 
This is the essence of the Constitution. No other law or government action 
may supersede the provisions of the Constitution. Each case must however be 
judged on its own facts. 
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Horn AJ in Deacon v Controller of Customs and Excise 61 SATC 275 said on 
page 281: 
" At the outset, I need to emphasize that there will be situations where an 
act of Parliament or conduct in terms of such an act by the authority 
concerned, by reason of the very nature of the act, its requirements and 
objects, would not be subject to the natural rules of justice. The exigencies of 
government are such that an individual cannot rely on the protection of the 
Constitution in every case where his rights may be adversely affected by an 
administrative act." 
In given circumstances public policy and public interest will hold sway over 
the rights of individuals in order to ensure effective governance. The use of 
the word "conduct" has important implications for the Commissioner and his 
staff because every action by a SARS official is subject to all the clauses 
contained in the Bill of Rights. 
Furthermore, these rights may not be limited in terms of section 36 of the 
Constitution as conduct is not considered to be law of general application. 
This view was espoused by O'Regan 3 in Premier Mpumulanga v Executive 
Committee of the Association of the Governing Bodies of State-Aided Schools, 
Eastern Transvaal CCT 10/98 on page 33 when she said: 
" In this case, in relation to the breach of section 24(b), no question of 
justification in terms of section 33 can arise as the decision taken by the 
second applicant did not constitute a law of general application as required by 
that provision." 
In that case the member of the Executive Council responsible for education 
in the province of Mpumulanga (the MEC) decided to discontinue paying all 
bursaries to Model C schools in the province with effect from July 1995. The 
decision was approved by the Provincial Executive Committee. The Executive 
Committee of the Association of Governing Bodies of State-Aided Schools: 
Eastern Transvaal challenged this in the Constitutional Court on the grounds 
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that their right to procedurally fair administrative action had been infringed as 
they had not been given reasonable notice of the action. The Constitutional 
Court agreed and found that the bursaries were discontinued retrospectively, 
without reason and without affording the Association and its members an 
opportunity to be heard or to re-negotiate contractual obligations in the light 
of its diminished income. The MEC's decision was therefore constitutionally 
invalid. 
If decisions or actions by government, which represent conduct as perceived 
above, are inconsistent with the Constitution they cannot be justified in terms 
of the limitation of rights clause (section 36). 
In this respect Chaskalson P had the following to say in Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers of SA and Another: In re Ex Parte President of the Republic of 
South Africa and Others CCT 31/99 on page 47: 
" It is a requirement of the rule of law that the exercise of public power by 
the executive and other functionaries should not be arbitrary. Decisions must 
be rationally related to the purpose for which the power was given, otherwise 
they are in effect arbitrary and inconsistent with this requirement. It follows 
that in order to pass constitutional scrutiny the exercise of public power by by 
the executive and other functionaries must, at least, comply with this 
requirement... If it does not, it falls short of the standards demanded by our 
Constitution for such action." 
Thus, although SARS has been granted vast powers in order to carry out their 
functions, they need to carry them out in a manner which will not be 
inconsistent with the Bill of Rights and will not infringe on any of the 
taxpayer's rights contained therein. 
In Deacon v Controller of Customs and Excise 61 SATC 275 the applicant had 
imported a vehicle from the United Kingdom and after taking delivery became 
aware of possible irregularities with regard to the importation. He brought this 
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to the attention of the appellant. Thereafter they agreed that the appellant 
would retain the vehicle pending a full investigation. The appellant heard no 
more from the respondent save for a letter advising him that the vehicle was 
liable for forfeiture in terms of section 87 of the Customs and Excise Act and 
was so seized and that he was required to deliver the vehicle to a state 
warehouse. The letter furthermore advised that he could apply for mitigation 
of the seizure in terms of section 93 of the Act. In order to avoid immediate 
attachment the applicant tendered to the respondent the amount that was 
due in respect of duties and penalties owing. Respondent, without giving 
reasons, refused the tender of the payment and the applicant thereafter 
obtained an interim order allowing him to retain possession of the vehicle 
until the matter was resolved by the court. 
Blieden J in Goodman Bros (Pty) Ltd v Transnet Ltd 1998 (4) SA 989 (W) said 
on page 997B-D: 
"...the Constitution has had a profound effect on the relationship which every 
organ of state, such as the respondent, has in its dealings with other persons 
or bodies and in the manner in which it conducts its business activities. 
Section 217 read together with sections 32(1) and 33 makes it plain that in 
addition to his common-law rights, any person dealing with a state organ, 
such as the respondent, is entitled to expect fairness, openness and equitable 
conduct from it in all its actions. The respondent is required to act in the spirit 
of the Constitution and the consequence of this is that in exercising his 
discretion ... the respondent is required to act 'fairly, responsibly, and 
honestly; it is not unfettered'." 
5.2.3 Delegation of duties and powers 
The Income Tax Act, the Value Added Tax Act and the Customs and Excise 
Act, as we have seen, all contain sections which deal with the delegation of 
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the Commissioner's duties and powers. The actions of these delegates would 
be included under the umbrella of the term "conduct". Any action undertaken 
by any person delegated by the Commissioner would be subject to review in 
terms of section 2 of the Constitution. 
In Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another CCT 35/99 0' 
Regan J had the following to say on page 45: 
" We must not lose sight of the fact that rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights 
must be protected and may not be unjustifiably infringed. It is for the 
Legislature to ensure that, when necessary, guidance is provided as to when 
limitation of rights will be justifiable. It is therefore not ordinarily sufficient for 
the Legislature merely to say that discretionary powers that may be exercised 
in a manner that could limit rights should be read in a manner consistent with 
the Constitution in light of the constitutional obligations placed on such 
officials to respect the Constitution. Such an approach would often not 
promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. Guidance will 
often be required to ensure that the Constitution takes root in the daily 
practice of governance. Where necessary, such guidance must be given. 
Guidance could be provided either in the legislation itself or, where 
appropriate, by a legislative requirement that delegated legislation be properly 
enacted by a competent authority." 
Thus, although the Commissioner is empowered to delegate his powers, this 
has to be carried out with care and guidance to ensure that the delegates 
exercise the power and authority in compliance with the Constitution. Any 
non-compliance with set down procedures or any action which is decided 
upon arbitrarily or carried out arbitrarily will be subject to review in terms of 
the Constitution. As will be discussed hereafter in Chapter 8, the SARS 
Income Practice Manual may also be a useful tool in the hands of a person 
who is challenging the conduct of SARS. In this volume are contained the 
internal procedures and practices followed by SARS. Although the Practice 
Manual does not itself amount to law which can be relied on for relief, a 
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review of conduct can be instituted in terms of section 33 (see 5.3.7.) of the 
Constitution and the PAJA, which is dealt with more comprehensively in 
Chapter 9 
5.3 The Bill of Rights (sections 7 to 39 ) 
Fundamental rights are dealt with in Chapter Two of the Constitution which is 
known as the Bill of Rights. It seeks to protect the rights and freedoms of 
individuals. 
The late Professor E Mureinik, expressing the importance of the Bill of Rights 
in the Constitution, wrote an article entitled A Bridge to Where? - Introducing 
the Interim Bill of Rights. On page 31 he wrote: 
• What the bridge is from is a culture of authority ... If the new Constitution is 
a bridge away from a culture of authority, it is clear what it be a bridge to. It 
must lead to a culture of justification - a culture in which every exercise of 
power is expected to be justified; in which the leadership given by the 
government rests on the cogency of the case offered in defence of its 
decisions, not the fear inspired by the force at its command. The new order 
must be a community built on persuasion, not coercion. If the Constitution is 
to be a bridge in this direction, it is plain that the Bill of Rights must be its 
chief strut. A Bill of Rights is a compendium of values empowering citizens 
affected by laws or decisions to demand justification. If it is ineffective in 
requiring governors to account to people governed by their decisions the 
remainder of the Constitution is unlikely to be very successful. The point of 
the Bill of Rights is consequently to spearhead the effort to bring about a 
culture of justification. That idea offers both a standard against which to 
evaluate Chapter 3 of the Interim Constitution and a resource with which to 
resolve the interpretive questions that it raises." 
The Constitutional Court guards these rights and determines whether or not 
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actions by the State are in accordance with constitutional provisions. The 
rights contained in the Bill of Rights are only limited in terms of law of general 
application and then only to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society. This is a particularly important 
point for taxpayers to bear in mind in their dealings with SARS as actions by 
SARS are not considered to be law of general application and SARS's actions 
cannot be vindicated in terms of section 36. 
According to L Olivier, in her article "The new search and seizure provisions of 
the Income Tax Act", the Commissioner is acutely aware of the untenable 
position that this puts him in. This is evident from the fact of his approach to 
the Constitutional Court in 1996 on an ex parte basis to get clarification on 
which sections needed to be amended to comply with the Constitution. 
Furthermore he attempted to get the Constitutional Court to rule whether the 
proposed amendments were acceptable. Unfortunately for the Commissioner, 
the Constitutional Court did not oblige and on 10 May 1996 informed him, 
without providing any reasons, that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the 
case. The Commissioner has and was, therefore, forced to defend any attack 
on the provisions of the Act on the basis that the sections either did not 
infringe the human rights guaranteed in terms of the Constitution or it was 
limited in terms of the general limitation clause of the Constitution. 
5.3.1 Rights 
Section 7(2) of the constitution reads as follows: 
" The state must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of 
Rights." 
This is an important section because it means that government organs and 
their employees have a positive duty to carry out their functions in relation to 
the Bill of Rights. 
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5.3.2 Application of the Constitution 
Section 8 dictates how and to whom the Bill of Rights should be applied: 
" (1) The Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the 
executive, the judiciary and all organs of state. 
(2) A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, 
and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of 
the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right. 
(3) When applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or juristic 
person in terms of subsection (2), a court 
a. in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, or if necessary 
develop, the common law to the extent that the legislation does not 
give effect to that right; and 
b. may develop rules of the common law to limit the right, provided that 
the limitation is in accordance with section 36(1). 
(4) A juristic person is entitled to the rights in the Bill of Rights to the extent 
required by the nature of the rights and the nature of that juristic 
person." 
This is the section which requires that SARS, as an administrative branch of 
government, conduct itself in a manner that is consistent with the provisions 
in the Bill of Rights. It is the link that brings' the two together and for this 
reason is a critical provision in the Bill of Rights. 
5.3.3 Equality 
Section 9 provides as follows: 
(1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection 
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and benefit of the law. 
(2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. 
To promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other measures 
designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken. 
(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against 
anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, 
marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, 
disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth. 
(4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone 
on one or more grounds in terms of subsection (3). National legislation 
must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination. 
(5) Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is 
unfair unless it is established that the discrimination is fair. 
A good example of the practical application of this was the different tax rates 
that applied to men, married women and unmarried women as provided for 
by the Income Tax Act. In order for the Income Tax Act to conform with the 
provisions of this section of the Constitution, the Act was amended in 1995 to 
provide a single rate for the abovementioned individuals. 
5.3.4 Privacy 
Section 14 of the Constitution states : 
" Everyone has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have 
a. their person or home searched; 
b. their property searched; 
c. their possessions seized; 
d. the privacy of their communications infringed." 
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Prior to Rudolph v CIR CCT 13/96, which is reviewed below at 7.4, the 
Commissioner had wide powers of search and seizure. This was the challenge 
mounted in that case, but since the seizure had taken place before the 
Interim Constitution came into effect, the application was dismissed. However 
the Commissioner must have taken note of the Constitutional Court's 
sentiments of the merits on the challenge because shortly thereafter the 
revenue acts were amended to be consistent with the Constitution. 
The privacy rights provided for by the Constitution have been incorporated 
into the Income Tax Act in section 74D so that Revenue officials may not call 
on anybody without reasonable prior notice and must do so with a written 
request. Any Revenue official who has been delegated to carry out such a 
task must produce an authorization letter on request. The significance of this 
is that only officials authorized by the Commissioner may inspect books and 
records of taxpayers. Furthermore, the authorized officials may only conduct a 
search where a warrant has been issued by a Judge of the High Court. 
Even after the amendments to the Income Tax, VAT and various other Acts, 
that were amended after Rudolph v CIR CCT 13/96, it is not impossible for a 
warrant to be challenged. In Haynes v CSARS 64 SATC 321, a case which 
came before the Transkei High Court, the circumstances upon which warrants 
for search and seizure were issued ex parte by a judge in Chambers in terms 
of the provisions of the Income Tax Act and the VAT Act, were challenged. 
The Commissioner had obtained the warrants and had seized documents at 
the taxpayer's premises. The taxpayer launched an urgent application to the 
Court submitting that, amongst other things, the warrant had not been 
correctly issued as the Commissioner had failed : 
1) to show on reasonable grounds that the taxpayer had not complied with 
the Income Tax and VAT Acts; 
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2) to lay before the judge, who issued the warrants, facts and circumstances 
which justified granting a warrant without bringing it to the notice of the 
taxpayer. 
The Court found that because of the above facts the warrant had been issued 
incorrectly and was therefore invalid. It ordered that all the documents seized 
be returned. 
This is in agreement with the finding by Tebbutt J in Park-Ross and Another v 
DirectonOffice for serious Economic Offences 1995 (2) SA 148 (C) where 
Tebbutt J confirmed, that in order to issue such a warrant, the issuing judge 
must ensure that the person seeking the authority (to search and seize) must 
have reasonable grounds to believe that an offence has been committed. 
Some years ago, people acting as agents for the Regional Services Councils 
approached businesses to inspect their books to verify that correct levies had 
been paid over. This took place again some time later. On enquiry it was 
confirmed by the Commissioner that only employees of SARS who are 
specifically delegated with written authorization may carry out such a task 
(B.Croome "Your right to privacy). 
A similar set of circumstances arose when inspectors appointed by Sector 
Education Training Authorities visited businesses requesting access to books 
to establish that correct skills development levies had been paid over. Again it 




Section 25(1) states: 
"No one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general 
application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property." 
In First National Bank t/a Wesbank v CSARS CCT 19/01 the Constitutional 
Court had to decide whether section 114 of the Customs and Excise Act was 
inconsistent with this section of the Constitution. In delivering his judgement, 
Ackermann J said the following on page 80: 
" Under the circumstances the conclusion is unavoidable that the infringement 
by section 114 of section 25(1) is not reasonable and justifiable in an open 
and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. The 
provision is accordingly constitutionally invalid." 
A similar finding was made in Lesapo v North West Agricultural Bank and 
Another CCT 23/99 where the Court found that the individual's right to access 
to a Court to have a dispute resolved had been violated. 
5.3.6 Access to information 
Section 32 reads as follows: 
" (1) Everyone has the right of access to 
a. any information held by the state; and 
b. any information that is held by another person and that is required for 
the exercise or protection of any rights. 
(2) National legislation must be inacted to give effect to this right, and may 
provide for reasonable measures to alleviate the administrative and 
financial burden on the state." 
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This section deals with the access to information and grants the right of 
access to any information held by the state and any information held by 
another person for the protection of any rights. 
In the converse situation, it should not be possible for representatives of the 
Commissioner to be allowed to make use of information to his advantage to 
which the taxpayer may not have access. 
It is not unknown for the representatives of the Commissioner to make use of 
unreported decisions of the Special Court to which he has access and the 
taxpayer does not. 
M Walpole on page 118 The Taxpayer Vol 6 No 5 writes: 
" I have noticed a disturbing readiness on the part of some of the 
Commissioner's officials to brandish unreported judgements at taxpayers 
when these support the Commissioner's case. I believe that occasionally the 
unreported judgement is produced as late in proceedings as in the course of 
an appeal in the Special Court. Taxpayers are therefore somewhat at the 
mercy of the Commissioner. They would certainly feel in such circumstances 
that any trust in 'fair play' is misplaced; and I have yet to hear of cases in 
which the Commissioner's representative has provided a taxpayer with a case 
that turned out in favour of the taxpayer. The practice smacks of unfairness 
and, I would submit, ought to be discouraged." 
Corbett JA (as he then was) in Estate Dempers v SIR 39 SATC 95,involving 
this very issue, expressed the Court's view on the matter on pages 106 and 
107: 
"... The use in court by the Secretary's representative of unreported 
judgements, where the consent of the taxpayer has not been obtained, 
amounts thus, in my view, to a breach of section 4 of the Act either by the 
representative himself or, when he is not a member of the Department, by 
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the departmental member who briefed him.To the extent that this has 
become a practice in the court's dealing with income tax appeals, this court 
should, in my opinion, state that the practice is not in accordance with the 
abovementioned secrecy provisions." 
I Wilson, a partner at Price Waterhouse Meyernel writes on page 140 of Tax 
Planning Vol 7 No 6: 
" It is submitted that, when the Commissioner intends to place reliance on an 
unreported case in assessing or attempting to assess taxpayers, he is morally 
bound to ensure that taxpayers have access to the entire judgement in the 
case. As a party in every case, he is entitled to a copy of the judgement. But 
the taxpayer should be the only other party entitled to receive a copy of the 
unreported judgement. By resorting to unreported judgements the 
Commissioner denies the taxpayer the opportunity to determine whether the 
case in question is distinguishable or whether the extract or principle relied 
upon forms part of the ratio decidendi. Accordingly, in the interests of the 
proper dispensation of justice, this practice should be discouraged." 
In light of the above opinions, it would seem that the practice adopted by the 
Commissioner's representatives would be contradictory to the spirit of section 
32 and section 33 of the Constitution. Moreover, should the Commissioner 
find himself in the position where he has in his possession documents or 
information which relate to the taxpayer's affairs and are required by the 
taxpayer for the protection of his rights under the Constitution, then the 
Commissioner is required to give the taxpayer access to all the relevant 
information in his possession. 
In Jeeva and Others v Receiver of Revenue, Port Elizabeth, and Others 57 
SATC 187 the appellants were directors, shareholders and employees of two 
company's which had been placed in liquidation at the request of SARS. SARS 
had authorized a raid on the companies offices and directors' homes early in 
1990 and had seized documents dating as far back as 1985. In the 
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meantime, the liquidators of the companies had applied to the Master of the 
High Court to hold a commission of inquiry into their affairs in terms of 
sections 417 and 418 of the Companies Act. At the time SARS was still in 
possession of all the documents from the appellants. Subpoenas were served 
on the appellants to attend the inquiry and to submit to interrogation. The 
appellants requested SARS to allow them access to the seized documents he 
had in his possession relevant to the inquiry. This request was denied by 
SARS and an urgent application was brought before the South Eastern Cape 
Local Division of the Supreme Court (now the High Court). The respondent 
argued that the appellants were not assisted by the Constitution as the 
documents were not required for the protection of any of their rights and in 
any event SARS were prevented from making the documents available 
because of the secrecy provisions in the Income Tax Act. 
Jones J, in finding for the appellants had the following to say on pages 196 
and 197 regarding their right to access to the information for the protection of 
their rights: 
" Much of the relevant information which will form the subject of the 
interrogation deals with company affairs going back over the years. Some of it 
is contained in documents seized by the Receiver of Revenue in 1990.The 
applicants have not had sight of these documents since then. They cannot be 
treated equally and fairly at this interrogation if they do not have sight of 
these and other relevant documents before the hearing." 
With respect to the refusal by the respondent to make the documents 
accessible to the appellants because of the secrecy provisions in the Income 
Tax Act he found as follows on page 210: 
" There is nothing secret about this information as far as the parties are 
concerned. It is accordingly entirely artificial to seek to invoke the secrecy 
principle of tax legislation at this time and in these circumstances. What is the 
purpose of preserving so-called secrecy by precluding the persons who gave 
the information in the first place from now having access to it ? The secrecy 
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principle has no application to these facts. None of the parties concerned is a 
stranger to the taxpayers. They are intimately associated and there is no 
conflict of interest between them and the taxpayer." 
This is an important judgement for the rights of the taxpayer as it sends a 
clear message to SARS that they cannot employ the secrecy sections of the 
revenue acts merely for their own convenience, nor to stack the deck against 
the taxpayer. If they wish to prevent access to information held by them they 
have to prove that the infringement of the individual's right to access is 
justifiable and fair. 
In Ferela (Pty)Ltd and Others v CIR a dispute had arisen between the 
Lourenco and Baeta families. The Lourenco family had brought an Anton Pillar 
type order to obtain books of a company which was owned by the Baeta 
family. This order was executed but was subsequently set aside and the 
Lourenco family ordered to return the books. The Lourenco family appealed 
against this, but this appeal failed and they were then ordered again to return 
the documents. Before they could return the documents, the Commissioner 
obtained a warrant for the documents on the basis of an affidavit from a 
chartered accountant who stated therein that he had investigated the affairs 
of the Baeta family group of companies, at the request of the Lourenco 
family, and discovered certain irregularities including a tax liability of R 70 
million. The Baeta family thereafter attempted to obtain a copy of the warrant 
issued in terms of section 74D of the Income Tax Act. They were denied 
access to the court file on the instructions of the Commissioner. 
They then appealed to the High Court submitting that their rights in terms of 
section 32 of the Constitution had been infringed in that the Commissioner 
had allowed himself to get involved in the dispute between the two families 
and that his intervention was interpreted to indicate that he had allowed 
himself to be used to frustrate the effect of a court order. The Commissioner 
was ordered to return all the documents and also to pay the Baeta family's 
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legal fees. 
This finding confirmed that the Commissioner is not permitted to simply join 
forces with a person when the taxpayer and that person have a dispute with 
each other. As far as the taxpayer is concerned, he cannot use the 
Constitution as a smokescreen to delay a trial in the Tax Court. This seemed 
to be the position in Alliance Cash & Carry (Pty) Ltd v CSARS 64 SATC 111. In 
this case the taxpayer was involved in a Special Court appeal against the 
Commissioner. It dealt with a dispute of whether certain goods had been sold 
to an export country and in such case would then be zero rated. The 
Commissioner required documentary evidence that the goods had in fact been 
exported. The taxpayer then applied to the High Court for an order requiring 
the Commissioner to make available certain documents that the taxpayer 
insisted were needed by him for the tax appeal. The High Court rejected the 
application stating that such matters were provided for in the rules of the 
Special Court and should have been argued there. The taxpayer then 
proceeded, with leave to appeal in the matter, to a Full Bench of the High 
Court where he argued that he had a constitutional right to have access to 
the documents and to be furnished with reasons for the disallowance of the 
VAT. The Full Bench of the High Court also rejected the application for the 
same reasons. 
The importance of this case is that, where a right that is protected by the 
Constitution is adequately dealt with by other legislation or Court rules, the 
latter should be exhausted first and not the Constitution. 
5.3.7 Just Administrative Action 
Section 33 of the Constitution reads as follows: 
" (1) Everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable 
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and procedurally fair. 
(2) Everyone whose rights have been adversely affected by administrative 
action has the right to be given written reasons. 
(3) National legislation must be enacted to give effect to these rights, and 
must 
a. provide for the review of administrative action by a court or, where 
appropriate, an independent and impartial tribunal; 
b. impose a duty on the state to give effect to the rights in subsections 
(1) and (2); and 
c. promote an efficient administration. 
In Carlson Investments Share Block (Pty) Ltd v CSARS 63 SATC 295 the 
appellant had lodged an objection against an income tax assessment issued 
by the Commissioner. Thereafter the Commissioner allowed the objection, 
based on a judgement in a similar case which seemed to reverse long 
standing precedent, and revised the assessment. The appellant thought, 
mistakenly, that that was the end of the matter. However, after a 
considerable time - but less than three years - had passed since the revised 
assessment had been issued, SARS advised the appellant them that the 
objection that had originally been allowed had now been rejected based on 
the fact that the judgement upon which SARS had originally based the 
allowance of the objection had recently been overturned by the Supreme 
Court of Appeal. The taxpayer bought an application before the 
Witwatersrand Local Division of the High Court seeking an order declaring 
section 79(1) of the Income Tax Act unconstitutional. 
Section 79(1) provides for the issuing of additional assessments: 
" (1) If at any time the Commissioner is satisfied -
(a) that any amount that was subject to tax and should have been 
assessed to tax under this Act has not been assessed to tax; or 
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(b) that any amount of tax that was chargeable and should have been 
assessed under this Act has not been assessed; or 
(c) that, as respects any tax which is chargeable and has become payable 
under this Act otherwise than under an assessment, such tax has not 
been paid in respect of any amount upon which such tax is chargeable 
or an amount is owing in respect of such tax, 
he shall raise an assessment or assessments in respect of the said amount or 
amounts, notwithstanding that an assessment or assessments may have been 
made upon the person concerned in respect of the year or years of 
assessment... provided that the commissioner shall not raise an assessment 
under this subsection -
(i) after a period of three years from the date of the assessment (if any) in 
terms of which any amount which should have been made upon the 
person concerned..." 
On page 307 of his lengthy judgement, Navsa J had some important points to 
make regarding administrative action: 
" It is beyond debate that public authorities such as the Revenue Service are 
bound, in exercising their statutory powers and complying with their duties, to 
have due regard to constitutional standards of fair administrative procedures 
and lawful administrative action. It is equally clear that arbitrary and 
capricious behaviour will not be tolerated. Statutes that permit such conduct 
will invariably be found wanting when measured against the Constitution. And 
of course, in considering whether administrative procedures are fair and 
whether administrative action was lawful a court will not be limited to 
considering only the application of the twin maxims of audi alteram partem 
and nemo iudex in sua causa. As is evident from the authorities cited by the 
applicant a court will look to the principle and procedures applied in a 
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particular case and will determine whether in the totality of the circumstances 
the person affected was treated fairly and whether the outcome was just." 
Unfortunately for the appellant the Court rejected the submission that SARS 
had acted unfairly and that section 79(1) was unconstitutional. 
However, on page 324 Navsa J found as follows: 
" To sum up: I conclude that the application is misconceived. The applicant's 
reliance on the doctrine of legitimate expectation is without substance. There 
is an express power and obligation to revisit a tax assessment and this power 
is provided in the national interest. There is no justifiable charge of an abuse 
of power. There is no conduct or practice by the respondent or anything else 
which the applicant can rely on to support its claim of legitimate expectation. 
Insofar as the functus officio principle is concerned the statute in question 
informs one that finality attaches only at the end of a three year period. In 
the interim, taxpayers know that they are to arrange their affairs accordingly. 
The logical but untenable extension of all the applicant's arguments is that in 
the circumstances where tax is in fact due and owing, it is exempted from 
such liability notwithstanding that other taxpayers similarly placed would be 
obliged to pay the tax in question or would in fact have paid it." 
In an earlier case, Waters v Khayalami Metropolitan Council 1997 (3) SA 476 
(W), Navsa J said on page 494: 
"It is, of course, fundamental to fair administration action that a person be 
afforded a full opportunity to hear the case against him and to state his case. 
Ideally, he should not, until the process has run its full course, be deprived of 
any of his rights." 
An early case which took advantage of the Interim Constitution was Tseleng v 
Chairman, Unemployment Insurance Board, and Another 1995 (3) SA 162 (T). 
In this case the applicant had applied for certain benefits under the 
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Unemployment Insurance Act. These were paid, but on re-application the 
application was denied. The applicant applied to have the Board's decision 
reviewed but this was also denied. Thereafter the applicant brought an 
application before the Transvaal Provincial Division of the High Court seeking 
a review of the Board's decision. The Court agreed with the applicant that the 
Board had breached his fundamental right, conferred on him by the 
Constitution, to have the right to procedurally fair administrative justice. The 
Court therefore set aside the Board's decision and referred it back to the 
Board for reconsideration. 
This decision is important for it confirms that the review process as 
contemplated by section 33 of the Constitution is not a piece of theoretical 
legislation but is a useful tool in the hands of individuals against state 
bureaucracy and authoritarianism. 
As a direct result of section 33(3) of the Constitution, the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act, No 3 of 2000 was promulgated. This will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter 9. 
5.3.8 Access To Courts 
Section 34 of the Constitution provides as follows: 
" Everyone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the 
application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where 
appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or forum." 
No law may prevent an individual from having access to a court of law to 
have a dispute resolved or action reviewed. From the cases that have been 
reviewed in Chapter 7 it is clear that some litigants appeal to the courts where 
they feel that their access to a court of law has been denied. In the main this 
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has been found not to be so. With the introduction of the new Constitution, 
more specifically section 33, and the PAJA, individuals have greater access to 
the courts. 
5.3.9 Self-Incriminating Evidence 
Section 35 is a large section covering the rights of arrested, detained and 
accused persons. Subsection 3(j) provides as follows: 
" Every accused person has the right to a fair trial, which includes the right... 
(j) not to be compelled to give self-incriminating evidence." 
The rights of accused persons are dealt with and specifically under (j), the 
right to not be compelled to give self-incriminating evidence. The Ferreira 
and Parbhoo cases, which are reviewed above, had important implications for 
legislation that was held to be inconsistent with this provision. In this regard 
Tebbutt J in Park-Ross and Another v Director: Office for Serious Economic 
Offences 1995 (2) SA 148 (C) confirmed on page 163 that South African law 
favours the approach of that of the American Courts which was espoused by 
Warren CJ on page 460 in Miranda v Arizona 384 US 436 (1966) when he 
said: 
" Our accusatory system of criminal justice demands that the government 
seeking to punish an individual produce the evidence against him by its own 
independent labours rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of compelling 
it from his own mouth." 
It is of vital importance that a taxpayer knows what his rights are with respect 
to giving self-incriminating evidence which could be used against him at a 
later date. The implications are illustrated well in two separate cases. In the 
first, S v Sebejan and Others 1997 (8) BCLR 1086 (T), it was confirmed that a 
suspect is entitled to the same fair pre-trial procedures as an arrested person 
and that if a suspect is deprived of the rights afforded to an arrested person 
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then they would be denied a fair trial. However in the second, S v Van der 
Merwe 1997 (10) BCLR 1470 (0), it was ruled by the Court that when 
incriminating statements are made before arrest and before the accused is 
even a suspect, there is no reason why the evidence may not be used by the 
prosecution at the trial. The main reason why the court came to this 
conclusion was that the evidence had been obtained spontaneously and 
without any pressure. In this instance it was admissible. This has an 
implication for the taxpayer. Should he be threatened with prosecution in 
terms of the Revenue Acts he may rely on his Constitutional right not to give 
self-incriminating evidence that can be used against him. Should SARS merely 
be wishing to obtain information regarding his civil liability, and have 
undertaken not to prosecute him, the constitutional protection will not be 
available. 
5.3.10 Limitation of Rights 
Section 36 states: 
" (1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of 
general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including 
a. the nature of the right; 
b. the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
c. the nature and the extent of the limitation; 
d. the relationship between the limitation and its purpose; and 
e. less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the 
Constitution, no law may limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights. 
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"Conduct" is not considered to be law of general application. This means that 
any "conduct" on the part of SARS cannot be justified by the limitations of 
rights clause above. Should their conduct, and that includes the exercising of 
a discretion, infringe on the rights of an individual, as contemplated by the 
Constitution, it will be invalid. 
It must be remembered, when dealing with rights and the limitation thereof, 
what Tebbutt J said in his judgement in Park-Ross and Another v Director: 
Office for Serious economic Offences 1995 (2) SA 148 (C). He stated on page 
152 that: 
"the party who seeks to establish the existence of the right bears the onus of 
proof insofar as the first leg of the inquiry is concerned, while the party who 
seeks the limitation of that right bears the onus of establishing the 
justification for that limitation in terms of s33(l) (of the Constitution)." 
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CHAPTER SIX 
The Constitutional Court 
6.1 Introduction 
The Constitutional Court plays an important part in everybody's lives in South 
Africa. Some may not even be aware of the part it plays because they have 
not experienced it directly. As will be seen from the First National Bank case, 
which is reviewed in Chapter 7, we are now able to look back to a time when 
there was no protector of individual rights and freedoms. The Constitutional 
Court is the body which is charged with interpreting and upholding the 
Constitution and in that way affects us all, directly and indirectly. This 
chapter gives a brief overview of the structure and workings of the 
Constitutional Court and the influence that it has on the rights of taxpayers. 
6.2 Establishment 
The Constitutional Court was established in 1994 by the first democratic 
constitution in South Africa, the Interim Constitution of 1993. This constitution 
became effective on 27 April 1994. The Constitutional Court commenced 
operations in February 1995. The Court comprises eleven judges of which two 
are women. The judges serve for a term of twelve years and may not be 
appointed for a further term. They are required to retire at the age of 70. 
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6.3 The Constitutional Court as the Highest Court in 
South Africa 
The Constitutional Court is the highest Court in the Republic of South Africa. 
Section 172(2)(a) of the Constitution provides as follows : 
"The Supreme Court of Appeal, a High Court or a court of similar status may 
make an order concerning the constitutional validity of an Act of Parliament, a 
provincial Act or any conduct of the President, but an order of constitutional 
invalidity has no force unless it is confirmed by the Constitutional Court." 
Thus it is clear that although a High Court or the Supreme Court of Appeal 
may rule on constitutional matters, if it rules that a piece of legislation is 
inconsistent with the Constitution, the ruling must be referred to the 
Constitutional Court for confirmation before the ruling will become effective. 
Nor is the Constitutional Court a law unto itself. It is obliged, and its primary 
role is, to uphold the Constitution. It cannot, it may not, make a ruling that is 
inconsistent with the Constitution that it is charged with upholding. In doing 
so it may consider the law developed in other democratic countries. 
6.4 The 1996 Constitution 
After the Interim Constitution had come into effect in April 1994, Parliament, 
sitting as the Constitutional Assembly, was required by it to produce a 
constitutional text that would form the new constitution. The Constitutional 
Court had an important part to play in the writing of the new constitution. It 
was required to certify that the text, submitted to it by the Constitutional 
Assembly, reflected the constitutional principles that had been agreed upon in 
advance by the negotiators of the Interim Constitution. In Ex parte 
Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly : in re Certification of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) the 
Constitutional Court ruled that it could not certify the text as there were parts 
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of it that did not reflect the agreements reached. The text was therefore 
referred back to Parliament. Parliament reconvened and made amendments 
to the text which was then adopted by Parliament in October 1996. In its 
subsequent judgement the Constitutional Court, certified that the text 
complied with the agreements reached. This text then became the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa and came into effect in 1997. The 
Constitutional Court has therefore, aside from the cases that were already 
coming before it before the new constitution was adopted, had an effect on 
the rights and freedoms of individuals by certifying the constitutional text. 
6.5 Constitutional Court Cases 
The method in which cases may be placed before the Constitutional Court is 
twofold. All cases that end up in the Constitutional Court must first be placed 
before the High Court. The High Court will then rule on the case and if it is a 
constitutional issue which requires the invalidating of legislation, the High 
Court will refer the judgement on to the Constitutional Court for confirmation. 
That is the first way that a case can reach the Constitutional Court. 
The second way is that if a matter is placed before the High Court and the 
High Court dismisses the application the appellants may apply directly to the 
Constitutional Court for leave to appeal. The judges of the Constitutional 
Court will consider the merits of the case and whether there is any reasonable 
chance that the application will succeed. Should they feel that there is such a 
reasonable chance, they will set it down for hearing. 
6.6 Cases before the Constitutional Court 
The Constitution requires that at least eight judges hear every case that is 
placed before them. Normally, however, eleven judges hear each case. This 
can be seen from the case reviews that follow in Chapter 7. Should a judge 
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not be available for attendance in the Court for a lengthy period, and a good 
example of this would be when Judge Goldstone was appointed to appear in 
the International Court in the Hague, the President of South Africa may 
appoint a judge on a temporary basis. 
Decisions in the Court are reached by a majority vote of the judges hearing 
the case. The judges either agree with the judgement of the judge who 
delivers the judgement of the Court, or disagree. Each judge must state his 
reasons for disagreement in a written judgement. The first case that is 
reviewed in Chapter 7, Ferreira v Levin NO and Others CCT 5/95, is a good 
example of this. In this case all the judges agreed with Ackermann J in his 
finding but for different reasons. However, one of the judges disagreed 
completely with the finding. 
The Constitutional Court does not carry out its task in exactly the same 
manner as the High Court or Supreme Court of Appeal in that it does not, in 
the main, hear evidence or argument or question witnesses. The parties to 
each matter, the appellants and the respondents, submit written arguments 
to the Court and the Court presents its finding thereon. It also does not deal 
with matters that do not have Constitutional bearing. All matters of this 
nature are dealt with by the courts previously mentioned. 
6.7 Relationship with Parliament and Provincial 
Assemblies 
The Constitutional Court has an important relationship with Parliament and 
the various provincial assemblies. Where there is a dispute in any of these 
bodies, regarding the constitutionality of legislation that has been passed and 
assented to, a third of the members may request the Constitutional Court to 
give a ruling thereon. In the same way, before assenting to new legislation, 
64 
the President of South Africa or any of the Provinciai Premiers may request 
the Constitutional Court to review the constitutionality of that legislation. 
6.8 Conclusion 
The Constitutional Court has an important role to play in the rights and 
freedoms of individuals. This role is dynamic in that, in interpreting the 
Constitution it is in effect developing the law of our country and how it should 
be applied. Section 8(3)(a) and (b) of the Constitution specifically encourages 
the courts to develop common law and common law rules. A good example of 
this in Chapter 7 is the Rudolph case because as a result of this case a 
number of revenue acts were amended. X Silke in his article entitled "Light at 
the end of the constitutional tunnel" writes 
" Most taxpayers who have challenged the constitutionality of a whole variety 
of fiscal provisions in the Income Tax Act and the Customs and Excise Act, 
have failed. But the recent decision of the Constitutional Court in First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v C:SARS & Another indicates that there 
is light at the end of the constitutional tunnel. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
A Review of Constitutional Court 
Cases 
7.1 Introduction 
There have been a number of cases referred to the Constitutional Court which 
affect taxpayers' rights either directly or indirectly. Each case will be examined 
to discover what important information can be gleaned with respect to 
taxpayers' rights and how the Court has interpreted these rights in respect of 
the Constitution and legislation prevailing at the time. In each case selected -
this is not an exhaustive study of Constitutional Court cases - there will be a 
brief review of the facts of the case. Then the essence of the judgements will 
be given and thereafter the points which are important to taxpayers will be 
discussed and how these points may be applied to the three acts discussed in 
chapter 3. 
7.2 Ferreira v Levin NO and Others CCT 5/95 
The issue before the Constitutional court was the constitutionality of section 
417(2)(b) of the Companies Act. This section provided for the examination of 
persons in the winding up of a company and read as follows: 
* 417. Summoning and examination of persons as to the affairs of company 
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(1) In any winding-up of a company unable to pay its debts, the Master or the 
Court may, at any time after a winding-up order has been made, summon 
before him or it any director or officer of the company or person known or 
suspected to have in his possession any property of the company or believed 
to be indebted to the company, or any person whom the Master or the Court 
deems capable of giving information concerning the trade, dealings, affairs or 
property of the company. 
(1A) Any person summoned under subsection (1) may be represented at his 
attendance before the Master or the Court by an attorney with or without 
counsel. 
(1) (a) The Master or the Court may examine any person summoned under 
section (1) on oath or affirmation concerning any matter referred to in 
that subsection, either orally or on written interrogatories, and may 
reduce his answers to writing and require him to sign them. 
(b) Any such person may be required to answer any question put to him 
at the examination, notwithstanding that the answer might tend to 
incriminate him, and any answer given to any such question may 
thereafter be used in evidence against him." 
This case was referred to the Constitutional Court by the Witwatersrand Local 
Division of the Supreme (now High) Court. It comprised two separate matters 
in which the appellants, Ferreira and Vryenhoek, had been summoned to 
appear at separate inquiries in terms of the above section. During the 
inquiries the appellants objected to being forced to give evidence which might 
be self-incriminating and which could be used against them in further 
proceedings. 
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They applied to the Supreme Court for interdicts prohibiting their further 
interrogation pending the determination of the constitutionality of section 
417(2)(b). In that case, on 28 November 1994, Van Schalkwyk J dismissed 
both applications but granted leave to appeal to a full bench of the Supreme 
Court and referred the matter to the Constitutional Court. 
The Constitutional Court had to decide whether the infringement of the 
individual's right not to give evidence which might later prejudice him was 
justified in terms of the need by the liquidators to obtain the evidence. 
In a lengthy judgement, delivered by Ackermann J, the Court had the 
following to say on page 124: 
" I conclude that section 417(2)(b) of the companies Act is inconsistent with 
the right to freedom protected in section 11(1) (of the Interim) Constitution to 
the extent indicated above. It must therefore pursuant to section 98(5) of the 
(Interim) Constitution, be declared invalid to the extent of such inconsistency. 
This is not a case where an order in terms of the proviso to section 98(5) 
ought to be made. The declaration of invalidity is very narrow. Its only effect 
will be to render inadmissible, in criminal proceedings against a person 
previously examined pursuant to the provisions of section 417(2)(b), 
incriminating evidence given by such person under compulsion of section 
417(2)(b). Neither the interests of justice nor good governance require that 
these provisions should be kept in force any longer." 
Chaskalson P agreed with the ultimate finding of Ackermann J that section 
417(2)(b) was unconstitutional but he disagreed with the reasoning. He 
elaborated on pages 126 and 127 as follows: 
" I am, however, unable to agree with his analysis of the issue of standing 
and with his interpretation of section 11(1) of the (Interim) Constitution on 
which he ultimately relies for his decision. In my view the matter is one in 
which the Applicants have standing and which can and should be dealt with 
under section 25(3) of the (Interim) Constitution ... A challenge to the 
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unconstitutionality of section 417(2)(b) should therefore, in my view, be 
characterised and dealt with as a challenge founded on the right to a fair 
criminal trial. It is precisely because section 417(2)(b) is inconsistent with that 
right, that its validity can be impugned." 
His view was that the reasoning should be positive in promoting the right of 
an accused to a fair trial rather than the negative alternative of protecting the 
freedom under section 11(1) of the (Interim) Constitution against all 
governmental action that could not be justified in terms of the Constitution. 
Mahomed DP, Didcott J, Langa J, Madala J and Trengrove AJ concurred with 
his judgement. 
Kriegler agreed with certain points in the above judgements but disagreed 
with all of the above judgements as a whole. In his view the previous 
judgements had effectively "jumped the gun" by providing immunity to the 
appellants against something that had not happened, nor had any certainty of 
happening. The appellants were concerned that evidence they might give 
might be used against them in some later proceedings. He stated the 
following on pages 148 and 151: 
" The essential flaw in the applicants' case is one of timing or, as the 
Americans and, occasionally, the Canadians call it, 'ripeness'. That term has a 
particular connotation in the constitutional jurisprudence of those countries 
which need not be analysed now. Suffice it to say that the doctrine of 
ripeness serves the useful purpose of highlighting that the business of a court 
is generally retrospective; it deals with situations or problems that have 
already ripened or crystallized, and not with prospective or hypothetical ones. 
Although, as Professor Sharpe points out and our Constitution acknowledges, 
the criteria for hearing a constitutional case are more generous than for 
ordinary suits, even cases for relief on constitutional grounds are not decided 
in the air. And the present cases seem to me, as I have tried to show in the 
parody above, to be pre-eminent examples of speculative cases. The time of 
this Court is too valuable to be frittered away on hypothetical fears of 
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corporate skeletons being discovered ... I would therefore dismiss both 
applications." 
Mokgoro J in turn agreed with Ackermann J, that the section was 
unconstitutional. However he agreed with Chaskalson P that the applicants 
did have the standing that Ackermann J had felt they did not have. Although 
he agreed with Chaskalson P, with regard to the meaning of "freedom" in 
section 11(1) of the (Interim) Constitution, he had a difference in respect of 
the interpretation by Chaskalson P of "freedom". 
O'Regan J said the following in her judgement on pages 160 tol64 and 166 : 
" In this case, however, although the challenge is against section 417(2)(b) in 
its entirety, the constitutional objection lies in the condition that evidence 
given under compulsion in an inquiry, whether incriminating or not, may be 
used in a subsequent prosecution. There is no allegation on the record of any 
actual or threatened prosecution in which such evidence is to be led. There 
can be little doubt that section 7(4) (of the Constitution) provides for a 
generous and expanded approach to standing in the constitutional context. 
The categories of persons who are granted standing to seek relief are far 
broader than our common law has ever permitted. In this respect, I agree 
with Chaskalson P. This expanded approach to standing is quite appropriate 
for constitutional litigation ... it is clear that in litigation of a public character, 
different considerations may be appropriate to determine who should have 
standing to launch litigation. In recognition of this, section 7(4) casts a wider 
net for standing than has traditionally been cast by the common law ... in the 
special circumstances of this case, it appears to me that the applicants may 
rely on section 7(4)(b)(v), as applicants acting in the public interest. The 
possibility that applicants may be granted standing on the grounds that they 
are acting in the public interest is a new departure in our law ... applicants 
under section 7(4)(b)(v) need to point to an infringement of or threat to the 
right of a particular person. They need to allege that, objectively speaking, 
the challenged rule or conduct is in breach of a right enshrined in chapter 3. 
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This flows from the notion of acting in the public interest ... in these special 
circumstances, it seems to me that the applicants have established standing 
to act in the public interest to challenge the constitutionality of section 
417(2)(b). Accordingly, I agree with Ackermann J that the applicants should 
be granted direct access in respect of the first issue referred to this court by 
the Transvaal Provincial Division of the Supreme Court. Once the court has 
considered and granted direct access, it must then decide the issue upon 
which it has granted direct access. No further considerations of standing 
arise. To that extent, I respectfully disagree with Ackermann J who, after 
granting direct access to the applicants, finds that they have no standing to 
challenge section 417(2)(b) on the grounds that it is in breach of section 25. 
He does of course find that they have standing to challenge the section on 
the grounds that it is in breach of section 11(1). It is my view, after weighing 
these considerations, that section 417(2)(b) constitutes an unjustifiable 
breach of section 25 (of the Interim Constitution). For the above reasons, I 
concur in the order proposed by Ackermann 3." 
Sachs 3 in his judgement had the following to say on pages 166, 181 to 184 
and 186: 
" In essence, I accept Ackermann J's contention that the issue engaged is a 
freedom one and not a fair trial one, and Chaskalson P's argument that the 
concept of constitutionally protected freedom as advanced by Ackermann J is 
too broad ... In South Africa today, 'enormous fraud' is unfortunately a 
continuing occurrence. As I have said, it might well be reasonable and 
justifiable to continue with inquisitorial procedures against officials of failed 
companies. The public interest undoubtedly requires both that fraudulent 
dealings be exposed and set aside where possible, and that those responsible 
be punished. The corporate veil functions not only in the legal level to 
promote corporate identity and create the conditions for limited liability, but 
also at the evidential level to hide the doings of dishonest company officials. 
Front companies and nominee companies can obscure the true economic 
nature of transactions. Frauds can be intricate, take place over a long time, 
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and depend on the effect of activities which in their separate detail appear 
lawful, but in their cumulative conjunction are fraudulent. There is no 
'smoking gun' to be detected by ordinary police methods. Yet, even allowing 
for the fact that special procedures of ancient provenance, designed to pierce 
the corporate veil and ensure that fraud is properly uncovered and punished, 
may pass the tests of reasonableness and justifiability, do they as well 
overcome the third hurdle provided by section 33(1) in relation to section 11, 
namely, that they are necessary ? I have grave doubts as to whether the 
materials placed before us indicate that the test of necessity has been met... 
in the words, once more, of Mr Justice Frankfurter: 'No doubt the 
constitutional privilege (against self-incrimination), may, on occasion save a 
guilty man from his just deserts. It was aimed at a more far-reaching evil - a 
recurrence of the Inquisition and the Star Chamber, even if not in their stark 
brutality. Prevention of the greater evil was deemed of more importance than 
occurrence of the lesser evil. Having had much experience with a tendency in 
human nature to abuse power, the Founders sought to close the doors 
against like future abuses by law enforcing-agencies.' The framers of our 
Constitution no doubt had more recent South African experience in mind 
when they drafted Chapter 3. To sum up: I agree with the implications of 
Ackermann J's judgement that section 417 should not be seen as a piece of 
criminal procedure legislation deliberately targetting company officials for 
specially harsh treatment, but rather as an integral part of an Act designed to 
consolidate law relating to companies ... I agree with the conclusions of 
Ackermann J and the order he proposes." 
This case is of great importance to the taxpayer as it prohibits the forcing of 
an individual to give evidence that may incriminate him which can be used 
against him in further proceeding. This can be applied to the inquiry 
provisions of the Income Tax Act, the VAT Act, Customs and Excise Act and 
for that matter, any other Act that places him in the same position. This 
would include, for example, under the Income Tax Act the provisions of 
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section 74 and the use of the section by SARS In inquiries, audits and 
investigations. 
Even if such evidence is handed over by the taxpayer it cannot be used 
against him. In R v Esposito (1985) 21 CCC (3d) 88 (1985) OR (2d) 356 (CA) 
it was stated that: 
" The rights of a suspect in respect of an accused to remain silent is deeply 
rooted in our legal tradition. The right operates at both the investigative stage 
of a criminal process and at the trial stage." 
In any event, from a practical point of view, it would be useless to confer 
protection to an accused from incriminating himself at trial if the protection 
did not also apply to pre-trial statements. This was pointed out in by 
McLachlin in R v Herbert (1990) 2 SCR 151 (57 CCC(3d). 
7.3 Harold Bernstein and Others v L. Von Wielligh Bester 
NO and Others CCT 23/95 
As in the previous case, the essence of this case involved a challenge on the 
constitutionality of section 417 and in this case also section 418 of the 
Companies Act. The case centred around the collapse of the Tollgate group of 
companies, one of the largest corporate collapses in South Africa. At the time 
the Tollgate Group had debts of approximately R400 million. Bernstein was a 
partner in the firm of Kessel Feinstein, Chartered Accountants who were the 
auditors of the Tollgate Group. 
In the investigation into the group's demise, certain irregularities were 
identified and certain directors and the chairman of the group were facing 
criminal charges relating to fraud and theft. Subsequent to the investigation 
into the affairs of the group, and following an application by the liquidators of 
the group, the Supreme Court (now the High Court) ordered that a 
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Commission of Enquiry be held into certain companies in the group. Bernstein 
in his capacity as partner of Kessel Feinstein was summonsed by the 
Commission to appear before it and produce certain documentation relating 
to the companies. Bernstein's attorneys then launched an application in the 
Supreme Court to have the order for the holding of the enquiry rescinded to 
the extent that it required partners and employees of Kessel Feinstein to be 
summonsed before the Commission, and to grant an interdict against the 
respondents and the Commissioner from using or disposing of or in any way 
disclosing to others any evidence given or documents obtained from the 
applicants. 
Futhermore, they sought an order interdicting the respondents from 
proceeding with examination of Bernstein or any employees of Kessel 
Feinstein, an order declaring sections 417 and 418 to be unconstitutional. 
This latter attack was advanced on the grounds that: 
* 1 . The whole mechanism created under sections 417 and 418 violates a 
whole cluster of inter-related and overlapping constitutional rights, 
namely, 
(a) the right to freedom and security of the person; 
(b) the general right to personal privacy; 
(c) the particular aspect of the right to personal privacy not to be subject 
to seizure of private possessions or the violation of private 
communications. 
2. The mechanism violates section 24 in that it permits an administrative 
interrogation in violation of the provisions of that section. 
3. Insofar as section 417(2)(b) deprives witnesses of their privilege against 
self-incrimination and renders their self-incriminating evidence admissible 
against them in subsequent criminal proceedings, it violates both the 
general as well as particular rights to a fair trial in terms of section 25(3). 
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4. Insofar as the mechanism permits the liquidator and the creditors of the 
company in liquidation to gain a fair advantage over their adversaries in 
civil litigation, that they should not have enjoyed but for the liquidation of 
the company, it violates : 
(a) an implied constitutional right to fairness in civil litigation; and 
(b) the guarantee of equality in terms of section 8." 
The Court in the previous case had already found that section 417(2)(b) was 
in violation of the Constitution. 
In this case Ackermann J, Kriegler J and O'Regan J concurred in ruling that, 
with the exception of section 417(2)(b), sections 417 and 418 did not violate 
the Constitution. In his judgement on page 21, Ackermann J quoted from 
Cloverbay Ltd (joint administrators) v Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International S.A. where the Court of Appeal stated the following: 
* It is clear that in exercising the discretion the Court has to balance the 
requirements of the liquidator against any possible oppression to the person 
to be examined. Such balancing depends on the relationship between the 
importance to the liquidator of obtaining the information on the one hand and 
the degree of oppression to the person sought to be examined on the other, if 
the information required is fundamental to any assessment of whether or not 
there is a cause of action and the degree of oppression is small (for example 
in the case of ordering the premature discovery of documents) the balance 
will manifestly come down in favour of making the order. Conversely, if the 
liquidator is seeking merely to dot the i's and cross the t's of a fairly clear 
claim by examining the proposed defendant to discover his defence, the 
balance would come down against making the order. Of course, few cases will 
be so clear: it will be for the judge in each case to reach his own conclusion." 
In the course of his judgement, on page 80, he said the following : 
"The public's interest in ascertaining the truth surrounding the collapse of the 
company, the liquidator's interest in a speedy and effective liquidation of the 
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company and the creditors' and contributors' financial interests in the 
recovery assets must be weighed against this, peripheral, infringement of the 
right not to be subjected to seizure of private possessions. Seen in this light, I 
have no doubt that sections 417(3) and 418(2) constitute a legitimate 
limitation of the right to personal privacy in terms of section 33 of the 
Constitution." 
On page 99 he continued: 
"I am alive to the thrust of the applicants' argument that, as erstwhile 
auditors of the company, they co-operated fully and were at all times 
prepared to co-operate fully with the liquidators and their legal and other 
advisors to supply all relevant information required. If in the light hereof it 
was oppressive, or vexatious or unfair to summons or interrogate the 
applicants in the way they were summonsed or interrogated, their remedy 
was, as I have repeatedly stated, to approach the Supreme Court. Their 
alleged harassment and unfair treatment would not be in consequence of the 
substantive content of the provisions of sections 417 and 418 of the Act, but 
as a result of their improper application." 
Although the case went against the appellant, this has important implications 
for the Commissioner for SARS as every time he claims to be exercising his 
powers of interrogation, inspection, audit and similar enquiries he has to 
ensure that his decision is not arbitrary and that all relevant considerations 
have been taken into account as this is what the courts will look to in their 
deliberations. 
7.4 Rudolph and Another v CSARS CCT 13/96 
This was one of the first cases to challenge the constitutionality of sections of 
the Income Tax Act. Rudolph was the sole director of Glyn Rudolph & Co 
(Pty) Ltd. On 22 April 1994 members of the respondent, acting under written 
authorisation, searched the appellant's office at the company's premises and 
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seized various documents. Rudolph subsequently brought an application 
before the Witwatersrand Local Division of the Supreme Court seeking an 
interim interdict restraining the Commissioner from exercising the powers of 
search and seizure as contemplated by section 74(3) of the Income Tax Act, 
pending a determination by the Constitutional Court of the constitutionality of 
that section. 
The Court dismissed the application stating that the Interim Constitution 
specifically precluded the Supreme Court from making orders that suspended, 
in whole or in part, Acts of Parliament. 
The appellants appealed to the Appellate Division (now the Supreme Court of 
Appeal) against this decision and directed their attack against the 
constitutionality of section 74(3) of the Income Tax Act. The matter was then 
referred to the Constitutional Court for a ruling on the common law grounds 
and failing this, the constitutionality of section 74(3). The Constitutional Court 
ruled that since the Interim Constitution did not operate retroactively, and the 
appellants were deprived of their possession, control and use of documents 
before the Interim Constitution came into force, it had no jurisdiction to rule 
on the matter and referred it back to the Appellate Division for it to rule on 
the common law grounds (Taxgram October 1994). 
These were as follows : 
• That an authorisation in terms of section 74(3), once issued and 
executed, may not be used in perpetuity and that the use in April 1994 
of the authorizations originally issued and executed in October 1993 
was invalid. 
• That the power to issue such authorizations was vested in the 
Commissioner, that the delegation of this power to the Chief Director 
of Administration in the Department of Finance under section 3(1) of 
the Act was invalid and that the authorizations were therefore invalid. 
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• That the authorizations were invalid on the ground that they were 
vaguely and imprecisely worded. 
Hefer JA, with Smalberger JA, Vivier JA, Nienaber JA and Plewman JA 
concurring, rejected the appellant's contentions and dismissed the application 
with costs. 
It would appear at first glance that the taxpayer did not benefit at all from 
this judgement. In respect of Rudolph this may be true but for the taxpayer 
community at large there is an intriguing point to note and it is this -
subsequent to this judgement the legislature was prompted to introduce new 
search and seizure procedures in the Income Tax Act, the Marketable 
Securities Act, the Transfer Duty Act, the Estate Duty Act, the Stamp Duties 
Act and the Value Added Tax Act. The essence of the changes made by the 
legislature was to require the Commissioner to have good reason for 
exercising his powers of search and seizure and to carry this out in a 
reasonable manner and at reasonable times. Furthermore, where the 
Commissioner found himself in the position that time was of the essence and 
that the search and seizure should be carried out immediately, without prior 
arrangement with the taxpayer and at odd hours, this could only be done by 
the issuing of a warrant by a Judge of the High Court after an ex parte 
application by the Commissioner. 
The Commissioner was no longer permitted to authorize such a search and 
seizure. This is intriguing because in the Rudolph case the Court had found 
against the taxpayer. 
The answer to this may lie in the case when it still lay before the 
Constitutional Court where the Commissioner's counsel made a concession in 
its written submission to the Court. J. Silke in his article in Vol 12 No 5 of The 
Taxpayer quotes on page 103 from the case: 
" In the light of the aforegoing it is submitted that common law grounds for 
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invalidity of administrative action fall within the jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court, including the Appellate Division, and that the Constitutional Court has 
no jurisdiction in such matters. Should it be held that this Court has such 
jurisdiction, it is conceded that one or more of the common law challenges 
should succeed." 
Again, although Rudolph lost his case on what may be considered to be a 
technicality of timing, the legislature took note of the Commissioner's 
concession and amended the aforementioned Acts before another attack 
arose against those provisions. 
7.5 Motsepe v CSARS CCT 3 5 / 9 6 
The appellant, ME Motsepe was the wife of SM Motsepe who was at the time 
a fugitive from justice. In December 1995 he had escaped from custody while 
being held on a charge of drug dealing (Moss-Morris Inc. Law News). The 
referral occurred in March 1996 in the course of an urgent application brought 
by the appellant as second respondent for the sequestration of the joint 
estate of ME and SM Motsepe, who were married in community of property. 
The sequestration action was brought by the Commissioner on the basis of 
outstanding income tax that arose from income tax assessment issued against 
SM Motsepe for the tax years 1988 to 1995. On 16 February 1996 the 
Commissioner filed a statement in terms of section 91(l)(b) with the clerk of 
the Rankuwa Magistrates Court. The section provides that if anybody fails to 
pay any tax or interest when it becomes payable the Commissioner may file 
with the clerk of the court a statement certified by him as correct and setting 
forth the amount of tax or interest so due or payable by that person. The 
filing of the statement with the court would then have all the effects of a civil 
judgement lawfully given. Section 92 of the Act provides further that nobody 
may question the correctness of a statement filed in terms of section 91. 
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Roos J, in the court aqo, referred only sections 92 and 94 to the 
Constitutional Court for consideration. 
Ackermann J in dismissing the referral noted that the referral was defective in 
that the applicant had not exhausted her non-constitutional remedies, the 
rules of the Court had not been followed and Counsel for the appellant's main 
thrust of argument was against section 91(l)(b) of the Income Tax Act 
although this had not been included in the application for referral. 
Furthermore, should the referral have been effective and section 91(l)(b) 
declared unconstitutional, the Commissioner would still have had his claim 
based on his assessments and would still have been able to sequestrate the 
joint estate. 
In awarding costs to the respondent, Ackermann J said the following on page 
23 of his judgement: 
"... when regard is had to the lack of candour in Mrs Motsepe's answering 
affidavit the conclusion can really not be avoided that her endeavour to 
engage this Court was little more than an attempt to gain time. It must not be 
thought that this conclusion in any way implies that the provisions of the Act 
might not be open to challenge; it relates solely to Mrs Motsepe's attempts to 
engage this Court in the light of the merits of the sequestration and the other 
remedies open to her which do not involve the constitutionality of any of the 
provisions of the Act. In my view her conduct was of such a nature that it 
warrants an award of costs against her." 
The lesson to be learned from this case is that any challenge of legislation 
must come only after all non-constitutional remedies have been exhausted. 
Furthermore, the laid down court rules and procedures must be followed. In 
other words the Constitutional Court is not to be treated with disrespect or 
contempt. 
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7.6 Harksen v Lane NO and Others CCT 9/97 
In some respects the circumstances of this case are similar to the case of 
Motsepe. Mrs Harksen was the wife of Jurgen Harksen upon whom a final 
sequestration order had been granted by the Cape of Good Hope Provincial 
Division of the Supreme Court on 16 October 1995. 
Ultimately, Mrs Harksen was summonsed to appear before the first meeting of 
creditors and to produce all documentation relating to Jurgen Harksen in 
terms of sections 64 and 65 of the Insolvency Act. Unlike Motsepe's case, the 
Court was satisfied that Harken had exhausted all her non-constitutional 
remedies. Counsel for the appellant argued that sections 21, 64 and 65 were 
inconsistent with certain of the provisions of the bill of rights to the extent 
that they impacted on the property and affairs of the solvent spouse upon 
sequestration of the estate of the insolvent spouse. 
In a lengthy judgement Goldstone J, with Chaskalson P, Langa DP, 
Ackermann J and Kriegler concurring, ruled that even if the provisions had 
discriminated against her as the spouse of the insolvent, they had not done so 
unfairly. On page 46 he said that: 
"... the inconvenience and burden of having to resist such a claim does not 
lead to an impairment of fundamental dignity or constitute an impairment of a 
comparably serious nature." 
However, in a minority dissenting judgement O'Regan J with Madala J, 
Mokgoro J and Sachs J concurring, said on page 74: 
"In summary, in determining whether section 21 meets the test for 
justifiability set by section 33 (of the Constitution), I must weigh the 
infringement of section 8(2) against the purpose and effect of section 21. As 
to the first, I have concluded that there is unfair discrimination against 
spouses. Although the extent of the infringement is not extremely offensive or 
egregious, it nevertheless constitutes a significant limitation of that right. On 
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the other hand, although the purpose of section 21 is an important one, the 
relationship between purpose and effect is not closely drawn. In particular, 
the balance between the interests of the spouse of the insolvent and the 
interests of the creditors of the insolvent estate seems to favour the interests 
of creditors disproportionately. The absence of similar provisions in other legal 
systems seems to support the conclusion that that balance has not been 
achieved. In the circumstances, I conclude that section 21 does not meet the 
test of section 33 and is therefore inconsistent with the provisions of the 
interim Constitution." 
Sachs J said on page 79: 
"In my view, section 21 of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 (the 'Act') 
represents more than an inconvenience to or burden upon the solvent 
spouse. It affronts his or her personal dignity as an independent person 
within the spousal relationship and perpetuates a vision of marriage rendered 
archaic by the values of the interim Constitution, thereby being unfair in 
terms of section 8(2) of the Interim Constitution." 
With regard to sections 64 and 65 the Court found unanimously that the 
sections were not inconsistent with the Constitution as they did not 
significantly limit the rights of Harksen. 
The implication for the taxpayer from this case relates to the manner in which 
taxpayers may be identified for inquiry, inspection, investigation, audit or 
even search and seizure. 
To be sure it is clear that the authority ordering any of the above needs to be 
absolutely certain that the taxpayer is not being unfairly discriminated against 
and that this is an avenue of defence for the taxpayer against arbitrary 
discrimination. 
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7.7 Mistry v Interim National Medical and Dental Council 
of South Africa CCT 13/97 
> 
This case is similar to the Rudolph case in that it involved a challenge of 
search and seizure provisions although not in respect of any of the Revenue 
Acts. It related to section 28(1) of the Medicines and Related Substances 
Control Act, No 101 of 1965. The applicant was a registered medical 
practitioner in private practice. On receipt of a letter of complaint, alleging 
that the applicant was committing fraud by claiming reimbursement from a 
medical aid for services he had not rendered, the Interim Medical and Dental 
Council ordered a search of the premises by a senior legal advisor on their 
staff. The search was carried out without the knowledge of the appellant who 
was present only towards the end of the search. During the search various 
items were seized and ultimately it was this that led to an urgent application 
to the Durban and Coast High Court for the return of the items seized and 
alternatively a referral to the Constitutional Court of the validity of section 
28(1) which empowers an inspector appointed in terms of that Act to carry 
out the search. Sachs J in delivering a unanimous judgement in favour of the 
appellant and confirming the inconsistency of section 28(1) with the spirit of 
the Interim Constitution said on page 27: 
" To sum up: irrespective of legitimate expectations of privacy which may be 
intruded upon in the process, and without any predetermined safeguards to 
minimise the extent of such intrusions where the nature of the investigations 
makes some invasion of privacy necessary, section 28(1) gives the inspectors 
carte blanche to enter any place, including private dwellings, where they 
reasonably suspect medicines to be, and then to inspect documents which 
may be of the intimate kind. The extent of the invasion of the important right 
to personal privacy authorised by section 28(1) is substantially 
disproportionate to its public purpose; the section is clearly overbroad in its 
reach and accordingly fails to pass the proportionality test laid down." 
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He continued on page 31: 
"At the end of the day, the reasonableness and justifiability of the powers 
given to the inspectors will depend on the overall scheme of checks and 
balances put in place to regulate their authority. Such scheme would have to 
take account of the statutory and social context in which the inspectors would 
have to function and would include, where appropriate, independent 
authorisation. Thus, the failure to distinguish between the circumstances 
where such authorisation would be required and those where a warrantless 
regulatory inspection would be quite in order, is in my view, a sufficiently 
material defect to undermine the scheme of section 28(1)." 
The importance of this case for the taxpayer is that it achieves what the 
Rudolph case failed to do - it substantially confirms that the search and 
seizure provisions of the various revenue acts would have been found wanting 
should they have been reviewed in light of the Interim Constitution. It lays 
down the principle that zealous government officials may not arbitrarily decide 
to infringe taxpayers' right to privacy. 
7.8 Parbhoo and Others v Getz and Others CCT 16/97 
The facts of this case are as follows: the applicants were the former directors 
of Plymouth International (Pty) Ltd which was wound up in October 1996. 
The first respondent was the liquidator of the company. In terms of section 
417 and 418 of the Companies Act, a commission of enquiry was held into the 
company's affairs. It appeared from the record of the commission that the 
liquidator was attempting to establish that the directors had committed fraud 
and that the liquidator and the company against whom the alleged fraud had 
taken place would use the evidence thus obtained in a criminal prosecution. 
The applicants were advised in December 1996 that they would be required 
to appear before a meeting of creditors at which they would be subjected to 
an interrogation in terms of sections 414 and 415 of the Companies Act. The 
applicants confirmed their attendance subject to their rights under the 
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Constitution. However, before the creditors' meeting took place, the 
applicants launched an urgent application before Southwood J in the 
Witwatersrand Local High Court concerning the possible use of evidence to be 
obtained at the meeting which might be self-incriminating and to be used in a 
subsequent criminal prosecution in violation of the appellants' constitutional 
rights. Southwood J, agreeing with the applicants concerns, found that 
section 415(3) read with section 415(5) of the Companies Act was invalid to 
the extent that any self-incriminating evidence obtained at such enquiry may 
not be used in criminal proceedings against the person who gave the 
evidence. As the High Court was not competent to confirm its own order it 
directed the registrar of the High Court to refer the matter to the 
Constitutional Court for confirmation of its order. Ackermann J, with 
Chaskalson P, Langa DP, Kriegler J, Goldstone J, Madala J, Mokgoro J, 
O'Regan 3 and Sachs J concurring confirmed the order of the High Court. 
This case was almost identical to that of Ferreira v Levin discussed above with 
that case examining section 417(2)(b) of the Companies Act. The importance 
of these two cases for the taxpayer is that he cannot be forced to advance 
evidence in any inquiry, audit, inspection or the like carried out by SARS 
which might be self-incriminating and which might be used against him in a 
criminal prosecution. 
7.9 The Premier, Province of Mpumalanga v Executive 
Committee of the Association of Governing Bodies of 
State-Aided Schools: Eastern Transvaal CCT 1 0 / 9 8 
In August 1995, a member of the applicant's administration responsible for 
education in the province of Mpumulanga decided that bursaries paid to 
certain needy students in state-aided schools would be discontinued with 
effect from July 1995. This decision in principle was not disputed because the 
students who benefitted from the bursaries were mainly white and it was 
85 
accepted by all the parties that this was a form of discrimination. The only 
dispute was the manner in which the bursaries had been terminated. The 
respondent brought an application before the Transvaal High Court in October 
1995 challenging the decision to terminate the bursaries on the grounds that 
it was procedurally unfair and therefore a breach of section 24 of the Interim 
Constitution. The order sought was to set aside the decision terminating the 
bursaries and to order the applicants to pay the bursaries until December 
1995. De Klerk J agreed and granted the order on 1 December 1995. The 
applicants then appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal (then still the 
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court). The Supreme Court of Appeal then 
postponed the case and granted the applicants leave to approach the 
Constitutional Court. 
In a unanimous judgement by the Court dismissing the appeal by the 
applicant, O'Regan J said on pages 28 to 31: 
" ... Towards the end of the 1994 school year, notice was given to the 
governing bodies that payment of transport and boarding bursaries would 
continue until the end of 1995 or until the new provincial governments 
decided otherwise. ... In all these circumstances, it is clear that the governing 
bodies of schools had a legitimate expectation that government bursaries 
would continue to be paid during the 1995 school year subject to reasonable 
notice by the government of its intention to terminate such payment. Such 
legitimate expectation that the bursaries would continue to be paid subject to 
reasonable notice meant that if the applicant wished to terminate the 
bursaries he could not do so unless he gave reasonable notice prior to 
termination. Once, however, he had given reasonable notice there would have 
been no obligation to consult with the governing bodies or the schools 
concerned. This legitimate expectation, therefore, is one which has 
intertwined substantive and procedural aspects as discussed above. ... The 
question that arises is whether the second applicant acted procedurally fairly 
in the context of legitimate expectation that the respondent and its members 
entertained. It needs to be emphasized that section 24(b) (of the Interim 
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Constitution) requires that administrative action which affects or threatens 
legitimate expectations be procedurally fair. That does not mean that in all 
circumstances a hearing will be required. It is well-established in our legal 
system and in others that what will constitute fairness in a particular case will 
depend on the circumstances of the case. ... In determining what constitutes 
procedural fairness in a given case, a court should be slow to impose 
obligations upon government which will inhibit its ability to make and 
implement policy effectively (a principle well recognised in our common law 
and that of other countries). As a young democracy facing immense 
challenges of transformation, we cannot deny the importance of the need to 
ensure the ability of the executive to act efficiently and promptly. On the 
other hand, to permit the implementation of retroactive decisions without, for 
example, affording parties an effective opportunity to make representations 
would flout another important principle, that of procedural fairness. ... I 
conclude that in the circumstances of this case the decision by the applicant 
to terminate the payment of bursaries to members of the respondent with 
actual retroactive effect and without affording those members an effective 
opportunity to be heard was a breach of their right to procedural fairness 
enshrined in section 24(b) of the Interim Constitution." 
This is an extremely important case for taxpayers because it confirms the 
right of an individual, in certain cases, to legitimate expectation and moreover 
a right to procedural fairness. In plain language this means that the 
Commissioner may not say one thing and do another and he may not make 
decisions which affect taxpayers' rights to procedural fairness without giving 
reasonable notice. What would constitute reasonable notice would be based 
on the facts of each separate case. 
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7.10 Lesapo v North West Agricultural Bank and Another 
CCT 23/99 
The essence of this case was the right of an individual to have any dispute 
that can be resolved by the application of law decided before a court. The 
applicant, a farmer, had borrowed R 60 000 from the respondent to enable 
him to purchase certain farming implements. The loan was made in terms of 
a written agreement. When the appellant fell into arrears the respondent, in 
terms of section 38(2) of the North West Agricultural Bank Act 14 of 1981, 
gave notice to the appellant of his intention to seize and sell the movable 
property which the applicant had pledged as security for the loan. Section 
38(2) of the Act provides as follows: 
" The Board may, in the circumstances contemplated by subsection (1) where 
the loan or advance has already been paid over to the debtor, by written 
notice addressed to the debtor, recall the said loan or advance in whole, and 
require the debtor to pay such loan or advance together with interest thereon 
up to the date of such notice within the time specified therefor in such notice, 
and in the event of default of payment on such specified date, the Board may 
in writing and under official seal of the Bank, require the messenger of the 
court or any other person designated by the Board to seize-
(a) in the case where such loan or advance has been secured by 
mortgage, the immovable property encumbered thereby; or 
(b) in the case where such a loan or advance has been secured 
by a deed of hypothecation of movable property, or where any 
other form of security has been given, the property 
encumbered by such deed or constituting such other form of 
security, 
without recourse to a court of law, and irrespective of whether or not such 
messenger of the court or such other person is a licensed auctioneer, to sell 
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such property by public auction on such date, and at such time and place and 
on such conditions as the Board may determine, of which at least 14 days' 
notice has been given in the Provincial Gazette and in a newspaper circulating 
in the district where the said property is situated or, as the case may be, 
where the said property was kept or used before such seizure, or the Board 
may itself sell the property so seized by public tender on such conditions as it 
may determine: provided that the provisions of this section shall not be 
construed so as to derogate from the provisions of subsection (4)." 
Upon his continued failure to pay, the Bank wrote a letter to the Messenger of 
the Court authorising him to seize and sell the property. In order to prevent 
the messenger from proceeding in terms of the notice, Lesapo brought an 
application before the Bophuthatswana High Court to declare section 38(2) 
invalid on account of its inconsistency with the Constitution. The respondent 
argued that there was no dispute between the parties with regard to the debt 
and hence the Court should find for the respondent. The Court disagreed and 
held that it was not necessary that a dispute be raised against the Bank's 
claim. The applicant had been summarily dispossessed of property and was 
aggrieved thereby and that was sufficient to entitle him to challenge the 
constitutionality of the legislation. 
On 20 May 1999 Mogoeng J granted the invalidation order and Lesapo 
certain consequential relief. The matter was then referred to the 
Constitutional Court for confirmation of the invalidation order in respect of 
section 38(2). 
In the Constitutional Court the respondent argued that section 38(2) had not 
infringed on the appellant's rights in terms of section 34 of the Constitution 
for two reasons: 
a) section 38(2) only becomes effective if there is no dispute between the 
parties with regard to the debt and as there was no dispute section 38(2) 
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could be invoked without being unconstitutional; and 
b) the notice to the messenger of the court is preceded by a notice of 
demand to the debtor and should he have a dispute he has the 
opportunity then to challenge it. 
The Court disagreed on both counts. Mokgoro J, who delivered the 
unanimous judgement on behalf of the Court stated, on page 6, the following 
with regard to point a): 
" Section 38(2) does not appear to be reasonably capable of such a restrained 
interpretation. Thus, properly construed, the application of section 38(2) is 
not limited to circumstances where there is no dispute, nor is the requirement 
of the absence of a dispute anywhere implied. If the legislature had indeed 
intended such a prerequisite, there seems to be no reason why it should not 
have provided so expressly." 
In respect of point b) he stated the following on page 7: 
"That, however is no answer to the challenge to the constitutionality of the 
section. Section 38(2) allows the Bank to bypass the courts. Without any 
judgement or order from any court and without any of the statutory or other 
safeguards applicable to the attachment and sale in execution of a judgement 
debt, section 38(2) authorises the Bank itself to bypass the courts and these 
other safeguards and to seize and sell the debtor's property of which the 
debtor was in lawful and undisturbed possession. This is so even where, 
under section 3892), the messenger of the court is required by the Bank to 
seize and sell the property because under the subsection the messenger can 
only be acting as the Bank's agent and not, as is normally the case, as an 
officer of the court. His instructions and authority emanate solely from the 
Bank and not from any court or court order." 
This case is important because it confirms and protects the right of an 
individual to settle a dispute before a court. This means that nobody can take 
action against him or against his property without his having access to the 
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courts for review of that action. Even in the instance, for example, where the 
Commissioner invokes section 74 of the Income Tax Act and obtains a 
warrant for the purposes of search and seizure, a judge of the High Court 
must be approached to obtain such warrant and he must be satisfied that 
there are justifiable reasons for such action. He is, in effect, looking after the 
taxpayer's rights. 
7.11 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers of SA and Another: 
In re Ex Parte President of the Republic of South 
Africa and Others CCT 31/99 
This case raised the question of whether a court has the power to review and 
set aside the decision by the President of the country to bring an Act of 
Parliament into force. Simply, the President had assented to an Act of 
Parliament, the South African Medicines and Medical Devices Regulatory 
Authority Act, 132 of 1998 (the 1998 Act). This act all but replaced the 
Medicines and Related Substances Control Act, 101 of 1965 (the 1965 Act) 
and made material amendments to the Fertilizers, Farm Feeds, Agricultural 
Remedies and Stock Remedies Act, 36 of 1947. Certain schedules provided in 
the 1965 Act which were essential for the operation of the 1998 Act were 
repealed by the 1998 Act and not replaced. The applicants alleged that, 
because the necessary schedules had been repealed by the 1998 Act and not 
replaced, the control of medicines, detailed by such schedules, was therefore 
rendered unworkable. 
They applied to the High Court for an order declaring the proclamation 
bringing the 1998 Act into force as invalid. The application was dismissed by 
Fabricius AJ who held that the President had acted within his powers and in 
good faith and that although the 1998 Act had been brought into force 
prematurely it was not sufficient cause to review the President's decision. On 
an application for leave to appeal against his decision this was dismissed. The 
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applicants then approached the Supreme Court of Appeal directly for leave to 
appeal to a Full Bench of the Transvaal High Court. 
The Full Bench, in upholding the appeal, ruled that the fact that the President 
was bona fide in the action that he took seemed to be quite irrelevant. 
Insofar as he purported to exercise any discretion that was conferred upon 
him by the legislature, he did so prematurely and without yet having the 
authority to do so. His act was accordingly of no force or effect. It followed 
that the Act was never validly brought into effect and accordingly the earlier 
legislation has not yet been lawfully repealed. 
The Judge President directed the Registrar of the Court to bring the Full 
Bench's decision to the attention of the Constitutional Court in case it needed 
to be confirmed by it. The Constitutional Court directed that it was necessary 
for the judgement to be so confirmed. In confirming the orders of the Full 
Bench , Chaskalson P commented on pages 50 and 51 that: 
" ... Parliament was not in session at the time because of the pending general 
election, and considerable cost and inconvenience would have been 
occasioned by calling Parliament together on the eve of the election for the 
sole purpose of reversing the President's decision. The fact that another 
course might possibly have been open to the applicants does not mean that 
the President's decision is not justiciable. There might be cases in which a 
court would decline to intervene in matters that are properly matters to be 
dealt with by the legislature, but this is not such a case. ... The applicants 
acted promptly in coming to court and there is nothing to suggest that any 
legitimate interest of any member of the public has been prejudiced by the 
order made by the Full Bench. On the contrary, a failure to confirm the order 
would have serious consequences for the control of medicines and could 
invalidate actions taken to that end in terms of the Act since the order was 
made. There are good reasons for intervention in the present case and in my 
view the order made by the Full Bench concerning the validity of the 
Proclamation was correct and should be confirmed." 
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This case is significant in that it directly challenged the actions of the 
President of the country. It means that nobody is above the law of the 
Constitution as interpreted by the Constitutional Court and that if legislation is 
enacted that has some material defect or practical impossibility it could in 
certain circumstances be declared invalid and set aside. This includes 
legislation that would affect taxpayers. 
It appears in the above case that the Court may have referred the legislation 
back to Parliament for correction if it had been in session. Thus, again, each 
case must be viewed on its own merits. 
7.12 Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs CCT 
35/99 
This case centres on the manner in which discretionary power, that legislation 
affords government officials, is carried out in the course of their duties. Three 
individuals, the applicants, being non-residents but residing in the Republic 
with their spouses, who were also residents, had applied for extensions to 
their existing temporary residence permits in order for them to remain in the 
Republic until such time as their immigration permits had been approved. The 
applications having been denied, the non-residents were ordered by officials 
of the Home Affairs Department to leave the Republic as they were non-
residents without the requisite residence permits. The applicants then brought 
applications to the High Court seeking orders declaring section 25(9)(b) of the 
Aliens Control Act, 96 of 1991 to be inconsistent with the Constitution in that 
it authorises the grant of immigration permits to the spouses of South African 
residents when the applicant spouse is present in South Africa only if the 
applicant is in possession of a temporary residence permit. Van Heerden A3 
upheld the applicants' arguments and referred the matter to the 
Constitutional Court for confirmation. O'Regan, in delivering a unanimous 
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judgement confirming the order of the High Court said the following on page 
47: 
"Whatever the language - Van Heerden A3 had in his High Court judgement 
observed that section 25(9) was not a model of legislative clarity - and 
purpose of section 25(9)(b), its effect is uncertain in any specific case 
because of discretionary powers contained in sections 26(3) and (6). The 
failure to identify the criteria relevant to the exercise of these powers in this 
case introduces an element of arbitrariness to their exercise that is 
inconsistent with the constitutional protection of the right to marry and 
establish a family. In my view, the effect of section 25(9)(b) read with 
sections 26(3) and (6) - section 26 deals with the granting of an extension of 
temporary residence permit - results in an unjustifiable infringement of the 
constitutional right of dignity of applicant spouses who are married to people 
lawfully and permanently resident in South Africa. There is no government 
purpose that I can discern that is achieved by the complete absence of 
guidance as to the countervailing factors relevant to the refusal of a 
temporary permit. In my view, therefore, section 25(9)(b) as read with 
sections 26(3) and (6) of the Act is unconstitutional" 
It appears from the court record that counsel for and representatives of the 
Department of Home Affairs, the respondents, did not endear themselves to 
the Constitutional Court as shortly before close of business on the day before 
the hearing they lodged their formal notice with the court of their 
intention not to oppose the application and did not appear at the hearing. 
O'Regan stated the following on pages 17 and 18: 
"The Minister and Director-General are respectively the political and 
administrative heads of the national government department responsible for 
the implementation of the Act and the foremost source of knowledge about its 
terms, objectives and general application. Their last-minute abandonment of 
both their appeal and their opposition to the confirmation proceedings was 
inconvenient and discourteous ... the Court must still decide whether to 
confirm, vary or set aside the order. Moreover, the Court must determine 
what ancillary orders should be made, if any. The relevant government 
department is best placed to assist the Court to craft such ancillary orders by 
informing it of the potential disruption that an order of invalidity may cause. 
By withdrawing from these proceedings at such a late stage, the respondents 
deprived this Court of the benefit of being able to canvass the issues relating 
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to confirmation fully at the proceedings..." 
It is clear from the case that government officials cannot apply discretion 
granted to them by statutory provision arbitrarily so that they infringe on the 
constitutional rights of individuals and this applies equally to the taxpayer. Nor 
will the Court tolerate or view kindly a last minute exit of government officials 
who carry with them substantial power to frustrate legitimate attempts by 
members of the public to fulfil their statutory requirements sometimes at 
great cost to themselves. 
7.13 Metcash Trading Limited v CSARS CCT 3 / 2 0 0 0 
This case attracted great media attention and the judgement was one that 
was keenly awaited by many because of the belief that sections 36(1) and 
sections 40(2)(a) and 40(5) of the VAT Act prevented the taxpayer access to 
a court of law to challenge an assessment raised by the Commissioner. The 
facts of the case were that after a number of meetings and correspondence 
between the parties to the case, as well as further investigations by the 
Commissioner, a letter dated 31 May 1999 was received by the appellant 
advising of the Commissioner's disatisfaction with the vat returns submitted to 
him for the period July 1996 to June 1997 and advising that he had made 
assessments, details of which were listed in an attached annexure. The 
assessments were arrived at by the disallowance of certain vat inputs claimed 
by the appellant with the result that the appellant was in debt to the 
respondent in the amount of R 265 934 943.04 including penalties and 
interest. The letter called for the payment of the debt by 30 June 1999, failing 
which, steps would be taken to recover the debt without further notice. The 
Chairman of the applicant led a delegation to meet with the respondent 
where it was pointed out that the respondent was sufficiently large to be in a 
position to pay whatever assessment it may be determined to be liable for 
and requesting the respondent not to require the appellant to pay the amount 
owing until such time, estimated to be no more than 60 days, as it could 
finalise its own investigation into the matter and whereafter SARS could 
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reassess its position. On 30 June 1999 an objection against the assessments 
was lodged as well as a formal request for an extension of time by 60 days 
referred to above. The respondent granted an additional 45 days commencing 
30 June 1999 and when this time proved inadequate, a letter from the 
appellants' attorneys was received by the respondent repeating the formal 
noting of the objection. On 13 September 1999 the respondent sent a letter 
to the applicant disallowing its objection and demanding payment of the 
outstanding amount within 48 hours. An urgent application was brought 
before the High Court in Johannesburg and Snyders J ultimately ruled in a 
reserved judgement that the sections of the VAT Act referred to above 
infringed the fundamental right of access to the courts afforded to everyone 
by section 34 of the Constitution. She interdicted the respondent from 
enforcing payment and referred her ruling to the Constitutional Court for 
confirmation. In the Constitutional Court, where there was unanimous 
concurrence in the judgement delivered by Kriegler J, the Court found at 
paragraph 72 that: 
"This analysis indicates that sections 36(1), 40(2)(a) and 40(5) do not oust 
the jurisdiction of the courts of law. To the extent that it can be argued that 
section 40(5) does indeed limit an aggrieved vendor's access to an ordinary 
court of law, such limitation is justified under section 36 of the Constitution." 
The importance of this judgement for taxpayers, although found in favour of 
the Commissioner, cannot be over emphasised. Kriegler J had some extremely 
significant points to make regarding the access that the taxpayer still has 
notwithstanding the provisions of the abovementioned three sections of the 
Vat Act. He said the following in paragraphs 46 and 68 : 
" Neither the injunction to pay first, regardless of a resort to the Special 
Court, nor the non-suspension provision is intended to or has the effect of 
prohibiting judicial intervention. Nor is there any hidden or implicit ouster of 
the jurisdiction of the courts to be found in section 36 as it stands. That 
section, therefore, cannot be said to bar the access to the courts protected by 
section 34 of the Constitution ... What cannot be left there, however, is the 
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belief that was common to the parties in both courts and that coloured the 
approach and conclusion of the learned judge in the High Court. The three 
provisions in question, section 36(1), section 40(2)(a) and section 40(5) of 
the Act, are found to pass constitutional muster because they do not bear the 
meaning ascribed to them in terms of common belief. Not one of these 
sections means, nor do any of them read together mean, that a vendor 
aggrieved by an assessment or other decision of the Commissioner is 
precluded from seeking appropriate judicial relief, notwithstanding that an 
appeal under the Act may be pending, whether to the Special Court or against 
its judgement." 
The appellants had believed (as had the High Court Judge), that in terms of 
section 36 of the VAT Act, which gives force to the Pay Now Argue Later rule, 
they would not be able to seek any relief, in respect of the demand to pay the 
amount owing to the respondent, from the courts. The Constitutional Court 
disagreed and expressed it thus at paragraph 42: 
" I cannot agree with Snyders J to the extent that she considered the exercise 
of the discretion conferred upon the Commissioner in section 36 of the (VAT) 
Act not to be reviewable. The Act gives the Commissioner the discretion to 
suspend an obligation to pay. It contemplates, therefore that notwithstanding 
the Pay Now, Argue Later rule, there will be circumstances in which it would 
be just for the Commissioner to suspend the obligation to make payment of 
the tax pending the determination of the appeal. What those circumstances 
are will depend on the facts of each particular case. The Commissioner must, 
however, be able to justify his decision as being rational. The action must 
also constitute just administrative action as required by section 33 of the 
Constitution and be in accordance with any legislation governing the review of 
administrative action." 
Here then is one of the most powerful defences or weapons that the taxpayer 
has in his dealings with SARS. Whenever a discretion is granted to SARS it 
must be exercised with care because it is subject to review. 
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This is the most important aspect of this case because the Constitutional 
Court has given its approval of this principle. Furthermore, the Commissioner 
released a media release on the same day (Taxgram December2000/January 
2001) as the judgement which stated: 
"... SARS is committed to affording taxpayers every right allowed to them in 
terms of the Value-Added Tax Act or other revenue acts with similar 
provisions. Thus, where circumstances justify this and full and proper reasons 
are placed before the Commissioner, the Commissioner will in appropriate 
circumstances direct that the taxpayer's obligation to pay tax, additional tax, 
penalty or interest may be partially or wholly suspended by an appeal or 
pending the decision of a court of law." 
The Commissioner has committed himself on public record to suspending the 
payment of tax, penalties and interest, pending the decision of a court of law, 
in appropriate cases. In terms of this therefore he would have to exercise 
this discretion carefully as it might be rejected by a court reviewing the 
exercise of discretion. 
Examples of situations where the Commissioner might exercise his discretion 
to suspend payment could be the following: 
• where the payment of the whole of the amount at issue would cause 
grave and serious hardship which could not be reversed if the taxpayer 
were to succeed in his appeal, and the circumstances of the case give rise 
to reasonable doubt; 
• other relevant circumstances, for example the certainty of the amount at 
issue being paid if the appeal were to fail. 
7.14 First National Bank t / a Wesbank v CSARS CCT 1 9 / 0 1 
The facts of this case were that First National Bank (FNB) under the trading 
name of Wesbank had leased a motor vehicle to Lauray Manufacturers CC 
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(Lauray) in November 1994 and a motor vehicle to Airpark Cold Halaal 
Storage CC (Airpark) in November 1995. In January 1996, it had sold, by way 
of instalment sale agreement in which it retained its ownership until the final 
instalment had been paid, a vehicle to Airpark. Additionally, some time prior 
to August 1993 FNB had entered into a similar agreement - the details of this 
transaction are not clear from the court record but it is assumed for this 
purpose that it was similar, if not identical, to either of the Lauray or Airpark 
transactions - with Republic Shoes for three vehicles. 
On 5 August 1993, 16 December 1996 and 7 April 1997 the Commissioner 
detained and thereby established a lien over the vehicles in the possession of 
Republic Shoes, Lauray and Airpark respectively in terms of section 114 of the 
Customs and Excise Act. 
The three were indebted to the Commissioner in respect of customs duty and 
penalties. At the time of the detentions of the vehicles substantial outstanding 
amounts were owing to FNB in respect of the contracts of lease and 
instalment sale agreements. FNB launched an application in the Cape of Good 
Hope High Court challenging the constitutionality of section 114 of the 
Customs and Excise Act which authorised the Commissioner to carry out his 
detention of the vehicles. The three separate cases were consolidated into 
one in the High Court. This case was dismissed by Conradie J whereupon FNB 
was granted leave to appeal by and appealed directly to the Constitutional 
Court. In the appeal before the Constitutional Court the Republic Shoes 
matter was not dealt with as the Court found' that it was not entitled to rule 
on it because the detention of the three vehicles, in that matter, had taken 
place on 5 August 1993 which date was prior to the coming into effect of the 
interim Constitution on 27 April 1994. The judgement of the Court was 
delivered by Ackermann J with the rest of the judges concurring unanimously. 
He stated the following on pages 23, 24, 25 and 77: 
" The keystone of the High Court's analysis of section 114 is the conclusion 
that section 114 turns third parties (credit grantors and affected owners) into 
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co-principal debtors, who are liable, with the customs debtor, for the payment 
of the customs duty debt in question. I am unaware of any authority, and 
none has been cited to us, for the proposition that a person having a lien over 
the property of a third party thereby acquires an independent cause of action 
against the third party owner. In fact authority is to the contrary. In Buzzard 
Electrical (Pty) Ltd v 158 Jan Smuts Avenue Investments (Pty) Ltd the 
Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed that a lien did not exist in vacuo to 
secure or reinforce Cter versekering of versterking') an underlying claim; 
accordingly neither a direct nor an indirect enrichment claim could be 
entertained if there had been no unjustified enrichment of the owner... It is 
against this background that the effect of the lien under section 114(l)(a)(ii) 
must be considered. In my view such lien, to the extent that it relates to the 
property of third parties who are not customs debtors, does no more than 
provide a further execution object for the recovery of the debt from the 
relevant customs debtor. There is nothing in the wording or purpose of this 
section providing for the statutory lien to suggest that a radical departure 
from the fundamental legal principles relating to liens, referred to above, is 
envisaged; least of all that a new and highly unusual form of co-principal 
customs duty liability is being created. As far as section 114 creates a lien 
over the property of third parties and enables the Commissioner to sell such 
property in execution of a customs debtor's obligation under the section, such 
liens over the property of third parties cannot, in, my view, be equated with 
that of the common law lien or the landlord's hypothec, as found by the High 
Court ... Here the end sought to be achieved by the deprivation is to exact 
payment of a customs debt. This is a legitimate and important legislative 
purpose, essential for the financial well-being of the country and in the 
interest of all its inhabitants. Section 114, however, casts the net far too wide. 
The means it uses sanctions the total deprivation of a person's property under 
circumstances where (a) such person has no connection with the transaction 
giving rise to the customs debt; (b) such property also has no connection with 
the customs debt; and (c) such person has not transacted with or placed the 
customs debtor in possession of the property under the circumstances that 
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have induced the Commissioner to act to her detriment in relation to the 
incurring of the customs debt. In the absence of any such relevant nexus, no 
sufficient reason exists for section 114 to deprive persons other than the 
customs debtor of their goods. Such deprivation is accordingly arbitrary for 
purposes of section 25(1) and consequently a limitation ( infringement) of 
such persons' rights." 
This case has importance to the taxpayer for two reasons. The first is that 
legislation cannot deprive an individual of his property arbitrarily. This applies 
even if there are good reasons for the deprivation thereof. In this case the 
Commissioner attempted to deprive FNB of its vehicles to settle a debt that 
was not owed by it. The second of these is mainly reflective in nature in that 
this case dealt with matters of a similar nature that occurred before and after 
the coming into effect of the Interim Constitution on 27 April 1994. In the 
Republic Shoes matter the detention of vehicles belonging to FNB occurred on 
5 August 1993. It was for this reason that the Constitutional Court had no 
jurisdiction. To many it might seem unfair that there should be no relief in the 
Republic Shoes matter when it concerned a matter similar to that of the other 
two merely because it took place at an earlier date. However, as Conradie J 
reminded the appellants in the earlier High Court case on page 449: 
" If this seems inequitable, the answer is that there is no equity about a tax." 
Taxpayers can look back to a time when they had no constitutional rights 
such as are represented in that case, or had no protection for their 
constitutional rights. They can also, however, look to the future with 




Relief And Remedy for the Taxpayer 
8.1 Introduction 
Relief and remedy for the taxpayer, from the actions of the South African 
Revenue Service, exists in three separate avenues and these must, normally, 
follow in order. These could be termed non- constitutional, administrative and 
constitutional avenues. The first avenue of relief, which is his non-
constitutional avenue of relief, is that which is provided by the revenue 
legislation itself. So, for instance, the Income Tax Act provides in sections 81 
to 86 for objections and appeals against income tax assessments. The VAT 
Act and the Customs and Excise Act, as well as other revenue acts, contain 
identical or similar provisions. It is to these provisions that the taxpayer would 
normally turn in order to question or challenge assessments and the like. This 
normally occurs where the Commissioner determines a taxpayer's liability for 
tax. Should the taxpayer feel aggrieved by the assessment he may object 
against it and again later, if not successful appeal to higher authorities. This is 
the normal route. Thereafter, if income tax, for example, is owing and is not 
settled by the taxpayer the Commissioner may institute actions or 
proceedings to recover that tax. It is at this point that an aggrieved taxpayer 
might, if he feels that his rights under the PAJA have been infringed, turn to 
the second avenue provided by the PAJA for relief. This would be the 
administrative avenue of relief. It would involve the review by the High Court 
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of an exercise of discretion by an administrator. His third avenue would be 
the constitutional avenue where the High Court, would again, first be 
approached to adjudicate on a legislative provision which the taxpayer 
believes infringes on his constitutional rights. The High Court would rule on 
this issue and, if the ruling includes the striking down of a piece of legislation, 
would in turn refer the ruling to the Constitutional Court for confirmation of 
the ruling. However, the taxpayer must be sure that before he enters the 
constitutional avenue, he has exhausted his non-constitutional and 
administrative options. The Constitutional Court will not normally entertain a 
constitutional challenge where these have not been exhausted. These three 
routes normally follow in this order but, as was seen in Chapter 7, this is not 
always the case. It may happen that a person is precluded, by legislation or 
an administrator, from any access to any forum to question or challenge 
conduct or legislation. In that case he must mount a challenge directly to the 
High Court or in exceptional circumstances the Constitutional Court. 
8.2 Non-Constitutional Avenue 
The normal route of challenging assessments would be in terms of, for 
example, section 81 of the Income Tax Act. In terms of this section the 
taxpayer would submit either: 
• written request for the reasons for the assessment - this was recently 
introduced into the objection process in order to comply with section 33 of 
the Constitution and the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act; or, if the 
reasons are known 
• a written objection in the prescribed form. 
This would normally have to be submitted within 30 days of receiving the 
assessment. The Commissioner would then reply to the objection, either 
allowing it or rejecting it. Should the objection be rejected and the taxpayer 
still feel aggrieved, he may note an appeal in the prescribed form within 30 
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days of receiving the notice of rejection of the objection. J. Silke, in his article 
"Settling disputes" writes as follows : 
"Before the introduction of the new rules, attempts at settling matters were 
rather haphazard, as described by AJ Swersky SC. : 'I usually settle matters 
with Revenue before the case even reaches the objection stage. After an 
appeal has been noted and the matter is ripe for consideration by the 
Commissioner's law-interpretation section, I make a practice of seeking an 
interview with the revenue officials concerned and endeavouring to persuade 
them that they are wrong or that there is room for a settlement. On one 
occasion I was told that no settlement was possible; yet a few days later, just 
before the proceedings commenced, the revenue officials changed their minds 
and decided that in fact a settlement could be reached. On other occasions, 
during the course of the trial, mention of the possibility of settlement is 
broached and after some bargaining a settlement may be reached'". 
In terms of new legislation, effective on 1 April 2003, a process known as 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) was introduced that provides the 
taxpayer with an additional avenue of resolving or negotiating disputes. The 
next section will summarise the reasons for the implementation of the ADR 
process and its structure. 
8.3 Alternative Dispute Resolution 
The South African Revenue Service's reason for introducing the ADR process 
was that it had received numerous complaints from taxpayers regarding the 
lengthy period taken to resolve objections to assessments. Of particular worry 
to them was the length of time taken between the lodging of an objection by 
the taxpayer and the response to the objection. It has not been unknown for 
SARS to take a year or more to decide on an objection. The ADR process 
allows disputes to be resolved outside of the litigation arena and is applicable 
to the following legislation: 
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• Income Tax Act, 1962 (Act No. 58 of 1962) 
• Marketable Securities Tax Act, 1948 (Act No. 32 of 1948) 
• Transfer Duty Act, 1949 (Act No. 40 of 1949) , 
• Estate Duty Act, 1955 (Act No. 45 of 1955) 
• Stamp Duties Act, 1968 (Act No.77 of 1968) 
• Value-Added Tax Act, 1991 (Act No.89 of 1991) 
• Tax on Retirement Funds Act, 1996 (Act No.38 of 1996) 
• Uncertificated Securities Tax Act, 1998 (Act No. 31 of 1998) 
• Skills Development Levies Act, 1999 (Act No. 9 of 1999) 
• Unemployment Insurance Contributions Act, 2002 (Act No. 4 of 2002) 
The Customs and Excise Act has a dispute resolution process of its own. 
Essentially the process commences at the appeal stage. Should the taxpayer 
feel it necessary to lodge an appeal against the rejection of an objection, he 
may, in the form lodged with the Tax Board to note the appeal, request ADR 
procedures. The taxpayer must accept the terms of the ADR set out on the 
reverse side of the prescribed appeal form for the process to operate. SARS 
must within 20 days of receiving the notice of appeal from the taxpayer, 
inform him whether it is of the opinion that the matter is capable of being 
resolved by the ADR proceedings. The ADR process should begin no later 
than 20 days after the receipt by SARS of the notice of appeal from the 
taxpayer. SARS will appoint a facilitator who would normally be a suitably 
qualified officer of SARS. He would be bound by a code of conduct and would 
seek a fair, equitable and legal resolution of the dispute. At the end of the 
process he would record any agreement reached and if not, record that no 
agreement was reached. It is important to be aware of the fact that the ADR 
process is conducted "without prejudice". No representation made or 
document tendered during the process may be used as evidence by the other 
party in any subsequent proceedings. Should the taxpayer feel, at the end of 
the process, that he wishes to continue the appeal, the appeal process would 
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continue as if from the lodging of the appeal. Prof. E Hamel writes in her 
article "How you can save time and money" : 
"... SARS is attempting to improve service to taxpayers by providing additional 
processes that can resolve any dispute between the parties. These new rules 
can help the taxpayer to save time and, in certain cases, money. Taxpayers 
and consultants should be aware of these new rules and procedures when the 
need arises to lodge an objection and noting an appeal. The new rules and 
procedures are an attempt by SARS to reinforce the statements in their client 
charter namely that the taxpayer can expect SARS to help them, to be fair to 
them, to protect their constitutional rights." 
8.4 Appeal to the Tax Board 
The Tax Board is established in terms of the Income Tax Act and normally 
consists of an advocate or attorney as chairman. The advocate or attorney is 
appointed by the Minister of Finance, in consultation with the Judge-President 
of the respective Provincial Division of the High Court, to a panel of advocates 
or attorneys. Should either the Chairman, the Commissioner or the taxpayer 
consider it necessary, an accountant or a representative of the commercial 
community may co-chair the Tax Board. The Tax Board is administered by the 
clerk of the Board, normally an officer of SARS. The Tax Board usually hears 
cases involving amounts not exceeding R 100 000. The appeal must be placed 
before the Board within 40 days of receipt of the notice of appeal or of the 
ADR process being terminated. The clerk of the Board will advise the taxpayer 
of the time and place of the hearing at least 30 days before the date of the 
hearing. The taxpayer will be present and may, with the permission of the 
Chairman, be represented by a legal representative. SARS will normally be 
represented by an officer from the branch office. Generally, the Board does 
not adhere to strict rules of evidence (SARS - Guide for dispute resolution 
pl3). Either of the parties may submit documents as evidence. The Chairman 
will thereafter give his ruling within 30 days, which the clerk will furnish to 
both parties within 10 days of receipt by him. Where the taxpayer is not 
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satisfied with the Tax Board's decision he must notify the clerk of the Tax 
Board with 30 days of receiving the Tax Board's decision. Where the 
Commissioner is dissatisfied he must refer the appeal to the Tax Court and 
notify the taxpayer within 30 days. 
8.5 Appeal to the Tax Court 
The Tax Court hears all cases in which the tax involved exceeds an amount 
R 100 000. In these cases, should the ADR process not prove successful or 
not be pursued the taxpayer will pursue the appeal in the Tax Court. The Tax 
Court is a formal court process where the taxpayer may represent himself or 
be represented by a legal representative. The Tax Court is presided over by 
the President, who is a judge or acting judge of the High Court, together with 
two assessors to assist the judge (a member of the accounting fraternity and 
a person of the business community. In certain cases, an expert such as a 
mining engineer or a valuer may assist the Judge. Where the amount, which 
is the subject of the dispute, exceeds R 50 million or where the Commissioner 
and the taxpayer jointly agree and apply to the Judge President, he may 
direct that the Tax Court hearing shall consist of three Judges or Acting 
Judges of the High Court. This is where the matter has finally reached formal 
courts. The rules which apply to the High Court would apply here and any 
further appeal would be in terms of these rules. 
8.6 Administrative Avenue 
In circumstances where a decision has been taken by an administrator or a 
discretion has been exercised and the taxpayer is dissatisfied with it he may 
bring an application before the High Court to have that decision or exercise of 
discretion reviewed. This would be in terms of the PAJA. In some cases this 
might take place before the non-constitutional avenue because, for example, 
that process has not been followed correctly or it is an issue which falls 
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outside of that process. A good example here would "be the case of Stroud v 
Riley 36 SATC 143. In that case the taxpayer approached the High Court on 
administrative review application because the Commissioner had not 
exercised his discretion in the taxpayer's favour and had not applied his mind 
correctly. The PAJA will be discussed in Chapter 9 in detail. 
8.7 Constitutional Avenue 
In this avenue of seeking relief the taxpayer must approach the High Court 
for a ruling on the constitutionality of a provision of legislation. The High 
Court, if striking down that provision, would refer the ruling to the 
Constitutional Court for confirmation. In exceptional circumstances the 
Constitutional Court may be approached directly but all non-constitutional and 




The Promotion of Administrative 
Justice Act, 3 of 2000 
9.1 Introduction 
The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (PAJA) was promulgated in terms 
of section 33 of the Constitution to give effect to the right to administrative 
action. This Act has important implications for the taxpayer in that decisions 
that are made by the Commissioner, in terms of a discretion, may be judicially 
reviewed. This is one of the most powerful defences that the taxpayer has in 
its dealings with the Commissioner. In the Metcash case the Commissioner 
had the discretion to suspend payment of the amounts owing by the 
taxpayer. The judge in that case found that the particular provisions of the 
VAT Act in question were not unconstitutional for the reason that the exercise 
of discretion was reviewable and the taxpayer therefore was not denied 
access to the Courts. He stated in paragraph 42 that: 
"(the exercise of discretion) must constitute 'just administrative action' as 
contemplated by section 33 of the Constitution." 
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9.2 Definition of Administrative Action 
Section 1 of the PAJA defines "administrative action" as: 
* any decision taken, or any failure to take a decision, by-
(a) an organ of state, when-
(i) exercising a power in terms of the Constitution or a provincial 
constitution; or 
(ii) exercising a public power or performing a public function in 
terms of any legislation; or 
(b) a natural or juristic person, other than an organ of state, when 
exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms of an 
empowering provision, which adversely affects the rights of any person 
and which has a direct, external legal effect,..." 
It must be remembered when applying this section that issuing of summons 
does not constitute administrative action and therefore cannot be challenged 
in terms of this Act. In Eastern Metropolitan Substructure v Peter Klein 
Investments (Pty) Ltd 2001 (4) SA 661 (W) the High Court held that the 
issuing of summons did not constitute administrative action but rather 
procedural action and in the circumstances precluded the respondent from 
relying on section 33 of the Constitution and indirectly the PAJA. In any event, 
the matter would still be reviewable if the respondent challenged the 
appellant's action in terms of the summons directly. 
9.3 Definition of a Decision 
A "decision" is defined as: 
"any decision of an administrative nature made, proposed to be made, or 
required to be made, as the case may be, under an empowering provision, 
no 
including a decision relating to-
(a) making, suspending, revoking or refusing to make an order, award or 
determination; 
(b) giving, suspending, revoking or refusing to give a certificate, direction, 
approval, consent or permission; 
(c) issuing, suspending, revoking or refusing to issue a licence, authority or 
other instrument; 
(d) imposing a condition or restriction; 
(e) making a declaration, demand or requirement; 
(f) retaining, or refusing to deliver up, an article; or 
(g) doing or refusing to do any act or thing of an administrative nature, and 
a reference to a failure to take a decision must be construed 
accordingly." 
From the above definitions it is clear that the discretionary decisions that the 
Commissioner is empowered with are reviewable in terms of the PAJA. 
9.4 Review of Conduct 
Section 6(2)(a)(ii) reads as follows: 
" (2) A court or tribunal has the power to judicially review an administrative 
action if-
(a) the administrator who took it-
(i) was not authorised to do so by the empowering provision; 
(ii) acted under a delegation of power which was not authorised by 
the empowering provision." 
This section is particularly pertinent as it allows a court or tribunal to judicially 
review an administrative action if the administrator who took it acted under a 
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delegation of power which was not authorized by the empowering provision. 
Section 3 of the Income Tax Act, section 5 of the Value Added Tax Act and 
section 3 of the Customs and Excise Act contain the powers of delegation 
provided to the Commissioner by each Act. It is these delegation powers that 
are referred to by section 6(2)(a)(ii) of the PAJA. The three sections referred 
to above must be strictly adhered to by SARS because any deviation or non-
compliance therewith would be subject to review as contemplated by Section 
6(2)(a)(ii). 
Furthermore, all jurisdictional facts of the relevant provision must be present. 
In Mpande Foodliner CC v CSARS this was found not to be the case. The 
Commissioner had invoked section 47 of the Value Added Tax Act by 
appointing an agent to collect vat which he believed due to him. In giving 
judgement for the taxpayer Patel JA said on page 61 (with respect to the 
invoking of section 47): 
" (1) It must be reasonably necessary to declare a person an agent of the 
taxpaying vendor; 
(2) who can only be declared an errant or a recalcitrant taxpayer if an 
amount of tax, additional tax, penalty or interest is due and payable; 
(3) only if the agent is required to make payments of such monies held by 
him or her for or due to the taxpaying vendor; and 
(4) only declare the person an agent if he, she or it is the taxpaying vendor's 
debtor. Each of the jurisdictional facts must be present and objectively 
determined before the first respondent is competent in issuing a section 
47 notice." 
In Stroud Riley & CO Ltd v Secretary for Inland Revenue 36 SATC 143 the 
company had overpaid non-residents' shareholders' tax but was not aware 
that it had made an overpayment at the time that it made the payment. At 
the time the respondent did not issue an assessment, which was the 
prevailing departmental practice in similar circumstances. Subsequently, the 
auditors of the company discovered the overpayment and the company 
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applied for a refund of the overpaid tax. The respondent satisfied himself that 
the tax was in fact overpaid but declined to approve the refund on the 
grounds that the application had been made more than three years after the 
tax had been paid. The applicant argued that since no assessment had been 
issued, the time period of three years had not commenced. The Court agreed 
with this. In its judgement it considered the word "may" which seemed to 
grant the respondent a discretion as to whether he should authorize the 
refund or not. The Court quoted the following principle which was set down 
by Jervis O in MacDougal v Paterson (1851) 11 CB 755 on page 766 as 
authority: 
"The word 'may' is merely used to confer the authority and the authority must 
be exercised, if circumstances are such as to call for its exercise." 
This is an important principle and means that the Commissioner must exercise 
his discretion in favour of the taxpayer where all the necessary requirements 
have been fulfilled by the taxpayer. 
9.5 Administrative Action Which Affects Any Person 
Section 3 reads as follows: 
" (1) Administrative action which materially and adversely affects the rights or 
legitimate expectations or any person must be procedurally fair. 
(2)(a) A fair administrative procedure depends on the circumstances of 
each case, 
(b) In order to give effect to the right to procedurally fair administrative 
action, an administrator, subject to subsection (4), must give a 
person referred to in subsection (1)-
(i) adequate notice of the nature and purpose of the proposed 
administrative action; 
(ii) a reasonable opportunity to make representations; 
(iii) a clear statement of the administrative action; 
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(iv) adequate notice of any right of review oi* internal appeal, where 
applicable; and 
(v) adequate notice of the right to request reasons in terms of 
section 5." 
In Premier, Mpumulanga v Executive Committee, Association of State-Aided 
Schools, Eastern Transvaal CCT 10/98 the essence of the case was that the 
appellant had not allowed the respondent reasonable time in which to prepare 
itself for the changes that were due to take place. The decision to suspend 
certain bursaries constituted administrative action as contemplated by section 
33 of the Constitution and was accordingly set aside in order to enable the 
respondent to have sufficient and reasonable time to prepare for the 
discontinuation of the bursaries. The details of this case were discussed more 
fully in 7.9. 
9.6 Reasons for Administrative Action 
Section 5(1) of PAJA provides that where a person's rights have been 
materially and adversely affected by an administrative action, and reasons 
have not been furnished, that person may request the administrator 
concerned to furnish him with written reasons. Should the reasons not be 
furnished it may be presumed, in any (court) proceedings or judicial review, 
that the administrative action was taken without good reason. 
This is an important section as it enables people to obtain reasons for the 
exercise of a discretion against them. Government officials can no longer 
make decisions without exercising thought and care and where they have not 
provided reasons where requested to do so the onus is on them, in court 
proceedings or a judicial review, to prove that their decision was not taken 
without good reason. 
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Section 32 and 33 of the Constitution work together in this regard. Section 33 
provides for fair administrative justice, which specifically includes written 
reasons for a decision, and section 32 provides for access to information held 
by the government. Fair administrative justice cannot exist, except in 
exceptional circumstances, without there being proper reasons. Reasons may 
not be understood if all the information that was required to make such 
decision is not available. A useful example to note in this regard is Rean 
International Supply Company (Pty) Ltd v Mpumulanga Gaming Board 1999 
(8) BC LR 918 (T). In this case the appellant company had applied to the 
respondent for a maintenance and supplier of gaming equipment licence. This 
had been refused. The appellant thereafter requested written reasons for the 
decision which the respondent duly provided. A request for further 
amplification of the reasons in the form of audio-recordings of the 
respondent's deliberations was agreed to but in an edited form. The appellant 
rejected this and immediately brought an application seeking the full audio-
recordings. 
Kirk, ADJP in his judgement for the appellant stated the following on pages 
926, 927 and 928 : 
"It is impossible to lay down a general rule of what could constitute adequate 
or proper reasons, for each case must depend upon its own facts ... it is clear 
that the reasons given must be intelligible and must adequately meet the 
substance of arguments advanced. On one hand it is not necessary for an 
administrative body to spoonfeed an aggrieved party seeking reasons; on the 
other hand the administrative body cannot expect an aggrieved party to seek 
justification for the reasons from a myriad of documents where such reasons 
cannot reasonably be determined. Section 32 of the Constitution grants to an 
applicant the right of access to all information held by the relevant authority. 
The word "information" is far wider than the concept of "facts" known to an 
administrative body. In terms of section 33 an aggrieved applicant is entitled 
to decide for himself whether administrative action was justifiable in relation 
to the reasons given for the refusal of a licence. In order to so decide, an 
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aggrieved party is entitled to "all information" which led up to the refusal of a 
licence and that includes the deliberations of the administrative body. To 
exclude such deliberations would render the provisions of section 33(l)(d) (of 
the Constitution) somewhat nugatory because the deliberations may 
demonstrate that the reasons upon which the board acted were unjustifiable 
or wrong. To exclude them from the ambit of sections 32 or 33 (of the 
Constitution) would impose an unjustifiable limitation upon the provisions of 
the Constitution." 
Thus, in terms of the above judgement, it may not be sufficient for an 
administrator merely to provide reasons. He may be required to provide 
further information in order for the aggrieved party to comprehend and 
appreciate those reasons. I Currie and J Klaaren, in their book "The AJA 
Benchbook", quote an Australian judge's explanation on page 223: 
* It requires the decision-maker to explain a decision in a way which will 
enable a person aggrieved to say in effect 'even though I may not agree with 
it, I now understand why the decision went against me. I am now in a 
position to decide whether that decision has involved an unwarranted finding 
of fact, or an error of law, which is worth challenging'." 
In Sidarov v Minister of Home Affairs 2001 (4) SA 202 (T) the appellant had 
been denied further temporary residence and business permits and had been 
offered insufficient reasons for the decision. In the meantime the Department 
of Home Affairs had indicated to the appellant that he was no longer 
considered a desirable inhabitant. The appellant thereafter brought an 
application before the High Court extending the temporary permits until 
finalisation of the review application. The Court in its judgement found that 
the applicant had presented a case which strongly suggested that the 
respondent's and the department's actions were irrational and were motivated 




This Act is a very important piece of legislation as it provides for formal 
protection of individual rights by way of making administrative decisions 
reviewable. However, every situation has to be decided on its own merits and 
individuals must be sure that they present the correct facts before the court. 
From a taxpayer's point of view, this Act gives him legislative access to the 




TOOLS FOR THE TAXPAYER 
10.1 Introduction 
In recent years, mainly since 1998, SARS has dramatically increased the 
amount of material with respect to its interpretation and application of 
Revenue legislation. These include inter alia, the SARS Income Tax Practice 
Manual, the Client Charter, media releases and press statements, 
interpretation notes and practice notes. Although these are not binding on 
SARS, the Commissioner will not act contrary to the treatment outlined 
therein without good reason. It must also be noted that interpretation and 
practice notes can be and have been withdrawn. A careful examination of the 
material available may assist a taxpayer in his dealings with SARS. 
10.2 The SARS Income Tax Practice Manual 
One of the ways in which SARS has become more transparent is by the 
publishing of the SARS Income Tax Practice Manual. Previously SARS had an 
income tax assessing handbook which was only available to SARS officials. 
The publication of the SARS Income Tax Practice Manual was undertaken in 
order for SARS to comply with section 32(l)(a) of the Constitution. This 
section provides that everyone has the right of access to information held by 
the state. 
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In this volume is contained the view that SARS would take with regard to a 
particular tax issue. Although the manual is not considered to be law and 
SARS cannot be held to it, taxpayers could rely on it in general terms to the 
extent that SARS would not deviate from it without good reason. However, in 
certain cases, local branch offices have disagreed with the interpretation 
taken therein. Moreover, the Commissioner does not warrant the correctness 
or currency of the practices therein. The bottom line is that it is merely a 
guide (Taxgram February 1997) and can only be taken at face value level. 
Furthermore, each case would be judged on its own merits. 
10.3 Advance Rulings 
10.3.1 Introduction 
Certainty is a general principle of taxation. Generally, internationally accepted 
advance ruling systems attempt to attain the following goals: 
• To give certainty to the tax treatment of transactions. 
• To promote self-assessment. 
• To promote good relations between tax authorities and taxpayers. 
• To ensure greater consistency in the application of the law. 
• To minimise controversy and litigation. 
• To achieve a more co-ordinated system. 
10.3.2 Advantages 
There are advantages for tax authorities and taxpayers of an advance tax 
ruling system. For the taxpayer it provides certainty as to the treatment of 
transactions with tax implications and the consequences thereof. For tax 
authorities it fosters more assurance in the tax system and fosters a better 
relationship with taxpayers. Furthermore it enables the tax authorities to 
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perceive what types of operation taxpayers are contemplating entering into 
and to prevent irregularities arising from deficient legislation which leads to 
unintended results. It also fosters efficiency by enabling the tax authorities to 
be able to react more promptly should future disputes arise. 
10.3.3 Disadvantages 
The risks for taxpayers relate essentially to the vulnerability of their business 
operations and trade secrets. This is of considerable concern to a taxpayer 
who is, on application, declined a decision. Even more perturbing for a 
taxpayer is that SARS' focus may be concentrated on him after a proposed 
operation has been rejected. Tax authorities are faced, by introducing the 
system, with acquiring dedicated and competent staff to attend to matters 
that arise. This would minimise the risk of incorrect rulings should 
incompetent staff be appointed, which in turn could ultimately lead to a loss 
of confidence in the tax authorities. 
10.3.4 International Models 
The International Guide to Advance Rulings published by the International 
Bureau of Fiscal Documentation provides in its introduction some useful 
insight into international use of advance ruling systems: 
" Despite the fact that a rulings procedure serves similar purposes in all 
countries, there are significant differences in the procedures adopted in 
various countries summarised in this service. Some countries have highly 
developed systems sanctioned by statute. Others have very informal, almost 
ad hoc procedures, stemming from largely unpublished administrative 
practice. While there has been some confluence of substantive tax law 
amongst countries, there has not necessarily been any similar developing 
uniformity in the administration of tax law. Different countries may have very 
different " tax cultures" resulting in different administrative procedures, and 
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the nature of an advance rulings procedure adopted by a particular country is 
undoubtedly influenced accordingly. It is thus difficult to make any broad 
comparisons or generalizations about the private rulings procedures used 
around the world. In most countries, tax authorities have generally been 
willing to answer inquiries made by taxpayers. Even without a formalized 
rulings procedure, it has become common for a binding administrative rulings 
procedure to develop in some countries, whereby the tax authorities will issue 
a ruling which they will honour even in the absence of a legislative 
requirement to do so. However, this practice is not universal." 
Among the countries systems that were examined, the following were 
subjected to closer examination : 
Australia, Canada, India, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden and the 
United States of America. 
On examination of the systems in these countries it is evident that there are 
two basic models in use: 
• A non-statutory approach - an administrative (non-statutory) system 
provided by a tax authority whereby taxpayers request the tax authorities 
to provide rulings in respect of a proposed transaction which ruling the tax 
authority accepts as binding. Canada is a useful example. 
• A statutory approach - a statutory, binding ruling system on how the tax 
laws apply to a particular arrangement or transaction. These binding 
rulings give taxpayers confidence about how the tax authority will apply 
the tax laws and assist taxpayers to meet their obligations. New Zealand is 
a good example. 
A different statutory type is that utilised by Sweden and India. In those 
countries an independent authority constituted by legislation provides rulings. 
In Sweden both sides may approach the independent authority for rulings. 
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These rulings are then binding on the tax authority. At least as far back as 
1998 there have been calls for SARS to join the inland revenue authorities in 
much of the rest of the developed world and provide taxpayers with advance 
rulings in respect of transactions they are contemplating entering. 
10.3.5 The Proposed South African Model 
The discussion paper issued by SARS which discusses the model that SARS 
has proposed includes the following elements: 
• It would have a statutory basis. 
• A centralised unit within SARS would issue rulings. In exceptional 
circumstances the Commissioner would be empowered to appoint skilled 
persons from outside SARS to give advice on specific matters. 
• All taxes would be covered, except for Customs and Excise, which already 
has a system in place. An investigation would be undertaken to determine 
whether that system should be encompassed within the proposed system. 
• There would be classes of rulings; binding general ruling, binding private 
ruling, binding class ruling, binding product ruling and non-binding private 
opinion. 
• All rulings would be binding on SARS but not the taxpayer except the non-
binding private opinion which would not be binding on SARS nor the 
taxpayer. 
• All rulings would be issued by the internal Tax Ruling Unit except for the 
non-binding private opinion which would be issued by the officers at the 
branch offices of SARS. 
• Fees would not be charged for the binding general ruling and the non-
binding private opinion but for all the others there would be fees charged. 
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The advance ruling system's purpose would be the following: 
• To promote clarity regarding the interpretation and application of tax law. 
• To promote certainty and consistency in the application of tax law. 
• To assist taxpayers to comply with tax laws. 
• To promote good relations with taxpayers. 
• To minimise controversy and tax litigation. 
10.3.6 Tax Without Advance Tax Rulings 
D. Clegg writes in his article "As a rule": 
"Unlike inland revenue authorities in much of the rest of the developed world, 
the South African Revenue Service (SARS) does not have a well developed 
system of providing taxpayers with - in advance - in respect of transactions 
into which they are contemplating entering." 
Admittedly, as referred to in the previous section, SARS has published the 
Income Tax Practice Manual, which is a useful volume in any tax practitioner's 
library. However, the Income Tax Practice Manual has no binding authority on 
the Commissioner in terms of tax legislation and as such cannot be relied on 
in the same manner that advance rulings are contemplated. This uncertainty 
has, in some instances in the past, forced taxpayers to approach the High 
Court for declaratory rulings in order to clarify a particular point. Should the 
advance tax ruling system not come about, taxpayers may have to continue 
along the same path as beforehand. 
In Chancellor, Masters and Scholars of the University of Oxford v CIR 58 SATC 
45, the Commissioner, in 1991, notified the Oxford University Press South 
Africa (OUPSA) of his revoking of their 1961 exemption from income tax. This 
led to the OUPSA seeking a declaratory order reinstating their tax exemption. 
This was ultimately successful. 
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The Court will not always assist the taxpayer. In Family Benefit Friendly 
Society v CIR 58 SATC 243, the Friendly Society had not commenced 
operations and was reluctant to do so until the disagreement between it and 
the Commissioner with regard to its status in terms of the Income Tax Act 
had been adjudicated upon by the High Court. 
Van Dijkhorst J said on page 251 of his ruling: 
"What the applicant seeks is an opinion by the Supreme Court to be added to 
its bundle of opinions from learned counsel, which may become useful should 
it decide to go into business and should it be able to enlist employers and 
members... the courts should not be utilised for this purpose." 
SARS has taken the first steps towards a system of advance rulings. In his 
2003 Budget Review the Minister of Finance announced that SARS was 
actively reviewing the possibility of introducing an advance ruling process and 
planned to release a discussion document in that regard (J.Silke "Advance Tax 
Rulings). Subsequent to this, the discussion paper on a proposed system for 
advance tax rulings was published. 
The discussion paper alluded to the fact that in South Africa at present there 
is no formal advance tax ruling system while taxpayers often approached 
SARS for guidance on a variety of tax issues. The paper referred to 
practice/interpretation notes, guides and brochures as an example of what is 
presently available for taxpayers to consult on a general basis. It was noted 
that occasionally, for a specific set of circumstances usually arising from a 
dispute between a taxpayer and a branch office, views or rulings are given. 
However, it was pointed out that there is no statutory basis for this and SARS 
is not bound by it. 
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10.3.7 Conclusion 
It would seem from the abovementioned information that there are positive 
and negative aspects with respect to advance ruling systems. However, we 
live in an imperfect world and it would seem that the positives of the 
implementation of such a system far outweigh the negatives. 
10.4 SARS Service Monitoring Office 
In an attempt to be more accountable, to try and deal more effectively with 
the service problems that SARS was experiencing and to get away from the 
image that nobody at SARS is really concerned about the taxpayer the 
Minister of Finance announced in his February 2002 Budget Speech that SARS 
would be launching a complaints office that would operate independently of 
branch offices. According to the SARS publication "Putting things right" in 
March 2002 he said : 
" Mechanisms are required to assist taxpayers who are having difficulty in 
resolving problems of a procedural nature with SARS. In line with the 
announcement made in the Budget Speech, SARS will establish an office 
which will function independently of branch offices, report directly to the 
Commissioner, and maintain an objective perspective on the complaints it 
receives. The creation of this office is tangible evidence of SARS's 
commitment to the improvement of service delivery. 
The office will fast-track and follow up on complaints on procedural matters 
that cannot be resolved at the branch office level. Where the complaint 
relates to a dispute as to the merits of a decision or assessment, the office 
will advise the taxpayer of the steps that he or she needs to take to make use 
of the dispute resolution mechanisms. The office will not be involved in 
deciding the merits of the assessment." 
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On 2 October 2002 the SARS Service Monitoring Office (SMO) was launched 
and became operational the following day (PriceWaterhouseCoopers-A way 
out for irate taxpayers). In order to give the Service an air of independence 
and impartiality Professor L Olivier, a well known and respected tax academic 
was appointed to be its head (B. Croome - SARS wants to hear your 
complaints). She has penned a number of tax articles and publications as well 
as serving as Acting Dean of the Faculty of Law at the Rand Afrikaans 
University. The SMO reports directly to the office of the Minister of Finance 
and is required to provide it with regular reports. 
According to the SARS publication" Providing a better service" the SMO would 
only be approached once the normal avenues of contact had been exhausted. 
So, for example, if a taxpayer had been attempting to resolve an issue 
relating to the issuing of an assessment subsequent to the submitting of an 
income tax return and no assessment had been issued after a considerable 
period of time he would approach the local revenue office. If no satisfactory 
action was forthcoming he would then approach the office's branch manager 
after which, having had no success there, he would approach the SMO. 
S. Taylor, in his article entitled "Please Mr Commissioner", writes : 
"So, while the Commissioner may hold all the cards, there are limits to how 
long he can hold up the game by refusing to play them." 
As stated above concerning the Minister's Budget Speech, the SMO will not 
deal with issues relating to the levying of tax, or VAT and any other taxes. It 
will only deal with operational issues where the normal system has stopped 
moving. 
The SMO is an office which has been set up by SARS to assist taxpayers with 
difficulties of an operational nature that they are experiencing and they 
should consider an approach to it before implementing an application to the 
courts. Thereafter if the SMO cannot assist their next step may well be to 
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approach the courts. 
10.5 The SARS Taxpayer Service Charter 
The SARS Taxpayer Service Charter was introduced in 2003 (Taxgram 
February 2003). According to B.Croome in his article entitled "Taxpayers' 
Rights" the Charter provides the following in respect of taxpayers rights : 
• to protect your constitutional rights 
by keeping your private affairs strictly confidential, 
by furnishing you with reasons for decisions taken, 
by applying the law consistently and impartially." 
Unfortunately the SARS Taxpayer Service Charter is not legislation and SARS 
cannot be held directly to its provisions as it is merely a statement of intent as 
to how it will conduct itself with respect to taxpayers' rights. The question 
arises as to whether there is any way to hold SARS to these provisions. The 
Constitution guarantees the rights in the SARS Taxpayer Service Charter and, 
moreover, in terms of the PAJA, any decision taken by an administrator must 
be supported by reasons for the decision. So, although it may seem that the 
SARS Taxpayer Service Charter is merely a statement of good intentions on 
the part of the SARS to deal fairly with taxpayers, it is indirectly accountable 
for its actions in terms of the Taxpayer Charter. It also becomes evident from 
the cases which have been brought before the courts that the courts will look 
at all the circumstances of a particular matter and if necessary will look to 
these types of statement of good faith in their consideration of the matters 
that lie before them. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
Common Law Assistance For The 
Taxpayer 
11.1 Introduction 
Over the years the courts, in their judgements, have developed common law. 
This chapter will briefly summarise common law which can work to the 
advantage of the taxpayer. 
11.2 Legitimate Expectations 
11.2.1 Introduction 
The principle of legitimate expectations originates from the United Kingdom. 
D. Clegg in his article "The Doctrine of Legitimate Expectations" reminds us 
on page 141 of Lord Denning MR's remark in.R v Liverpool Corporation (1972) 
2QB 249: 
" that it was a well-established principle of law that a public body entrusted 
by the legislature with certain powers and duties cannot divest itself of them, 
nor act in a manner incompatible with them." 
In Schmidt v Secretary of State for Home Affairs [1969] 2 Ch 149 (CA), where 
the principle of legitimate expectation was first applied to administrative law, 
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he had the following to say: 
"... an administrative body may, in a proper case, be bound to give a person 
who is affected by their decision an opportunity of. making representations. It 
all depends on whether he has some right or interest, or, I would add, some 
legitimate expectation, of which it would not be fair to deprive him without 
hearing what he has to say." 
Bingham U, in a concurring judgement in R v Liverpool Corporation (1972) 
2QB 249, stated: 
"If the taxpayer approaches the Revenue with clear and precise proposals 
about the future conduct of his fiscal affairs and receives an unequivocal 
statement about how they will be treated for tax purposes if implemented, 
the Revenue should in my judgement be subject to ... review on grounds of 
unfair abuse of power if it peremptorily decides that it will not be bound by 
such statements when the taxpayer has relied on them. The same principle 
should apply to Revenue statements of policy." 
Lord Roskill said the following in Council of Civil Service Unions and Others v 
Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374: 
" Legitimate, or reasonable, expectation may arise either from an express 
promise given on behalf of a public authority or from the existence of a 
regular practice which the claimant can reasonably expect to continue." 
11.2.2 South African Cases 
Corbett O, in Administrator, Transvaal and Others v Traub and Others 1989 
(4) SA 731 (A) noted that a legitimate expectation must have a reasonable 
basis. It had, he said, been utilised by courts in Australia and New Zealand in 
the context of judicial review of administrative action. His conclusion on page 
748 was: 
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"In my opinion, there is a similar need in this country. There are many cases 
where one can visualise in this sphere ... where an adherence to the formula 
of 'liberty, property and existing rights' would fail to provide a legal remedy, 
where the facts cry out for one; and would result in a decision which 
appeared to have been arrived at by a procedure which was clearly unfair 
being immune from review. The law should in such cases be made to reach 
out and come to the aid of persons prejudicially affected. At the same time, 
whereas the concepts of liberty, property and existing rights are reasonably 
well defined, that of legitimate expectation is not. Like public policy, unless 
carefully handled it could become an unruly horse. And, in working out, 
incrementally, on the facts of each case, where the doctrine of legitimate 
expectation applies and where it does not, the Courts will, no doubt, bear in 
mind the need to protect the individual from decisions unfairly arrived at by 
public authority (and in certain domestic tribunals) and the contrary 
desirability of avoiding undue judicial interference in their administration." 
Corbett CJ also recognised that a legitimate expectation might arise in two 
ways: 
• where a person enjoys an expectation of a privilege or a benefit of which 
it would not be fair to deprive him without a fair hearing: 
• where the previous conduct of an official has given rise to an expectation 
that a particular procedure will be followed before a decision is made. 
In Premier, Province of Mpumulanga and Another v Executive Committee of 
the Association of Governing Bodies of State-Aided Schools: Eastern Transvaal 
CCT 10/98 O'Regan J said in her judgement that once a person establishes a 
legitimate expectation in terms of the Constitution, he will be entitled to 
procedural fairness in relation to administrative action that may affect or 
threaten that expectation. 
D Clegg, in his article on legitimate expectation, discusses the effect that it 
has on Practice Notes, the SARS Practice Manual and individual rulings. His 
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conclusion is that no reliance can be placed on Practice Notes. With regard to 
the SARS Practice Manual, if it has no disclaimer and it is proved that it is a 
correct representation of the Commissioner's actual practice it can be relied 
on from a legitimate expectation point of view. He argues that individual 
rulings should be able to be relied on depending on the facts of each case. 
Although the doctrine of "legitimate expectation" has been mentioned many 
times in passing, in cases such as the ones quoted above, the only case that 
appears to have come before the courts in Southern Africa which directly 
considered the doctrine is COT v Astra Holdings (Private) Ltd t/a Puzey & 
Payne 66 SATC 116, a Zimbabwean case. In that case, which started out as 
ITC 1674, the respondent was an owner of a business selling motor vehicles 
to the members of the public. He had been charging sales tax, as was 
required by law. At some point he came into possession of a letter addressed 
to one of his colleagues in the same industry from the appellant's office 
confirming that no sales tax was chargeable on the vehicles as they were paid 
for with foreign currency. From then on and for almost the next two years he 
did not charge sales tax as per the letter. During two inspections of his books 
by revenue officials no mention had been made by the respective inspectors 
of the sales tax. During a subsequent inspection of his books and after a 
comparison with his monthly returns the appellant issued the respondent with 
assessments for sales tax on the sale of the vehicles. The respondent brought 
an action in the Zimbabwe Fiscal Appeal Court. The Court ruled for the 
respondent (in that case the appellant) on the basis that he had a legitimate 
expectation originating from the letter. The appellant then took the case on 
appeal to the Zimbabwe Supreme Court. In their ruling the Court found that 
the letter was based on an error in law and it said that the respondent could 
never rely on legitimate expectation when it was derived from an error in law. 
Thus the Fiscal Appeal Court's ruling was set aside and the taxpayer was 
ordered to pay the sales tax. 
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11.2.3 Conclusion 
Legitimate expectation is an area of tax law that has not been fully tested in 
South Africa. Taxpayers should be extremely careful before venturing into its 
untested waters. They should also be extremely sure of all the facts of their 
case and how the law applies to it. 
J. Silke in his article " Legitimate expectations" makes the following points : 
• A taxpayer should obtain his own ruling from the Commissioner, and not 
rely on rulings given to other taxpayers even if the subject matter is 
identical. 
• South African tax legislation provides for a 'practice generally prevailing' 
being initiated by the Commissioner with specific consequences, but then 
this practice must fulfil certain requirements. 
• SARS has issued a Discussion Paper on a proposed system for advance tax 
rulings which, once introduced into the Income Tax Act, will go a far way 
in giving certainty to the tax treatment of transactions between the 
Commissioner and the taxpayer concerned, thereby lessening the need to 
resort to the more obscure branch of administrative law on which the 
doctrine of legitimate expectation is based. 
Should the system of advance rulings see the light of day, this might go some 
way to preventing taxpayers from having to rely on the doctrine of legitimate 
expectation to justify their actions. 
11.3 The "Contra Fiscum" Rule 
Simply put, the "contra fiscum"xu\Q means that if a case of ambiguity arises 
in a provision that imposes a revenue charge, the provision must be read in 
favour of the taxpayer. This was stated in the case of CIR v Insolvent Estate 
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Botha 52 SATC 47. Although this is unusual, it can be of benefit to the 
taxpayer. It must also be remembered that the "contra fiscum"'rule does not 
apply to the interpretation of anti-avoidance provisions of the Income Tax Act 
(M.Kolitz Tax Avoidance). 
11.4 The "Audi Alteram Partem" Principle 
This principle means that a person whose rights will be affected prejudicially 
should be given the opportunity to be heard or to defend himself. In Deacon 
v Controller of Customs and Excise 61 SATC 275 the Court said on page 283 
of the audi alteram partem principle: 
" The greater or more serious the intrusion and far-reaching the prejudice, 
the more readily will the courts uphold the audi-principle." 
In this case the judge found that it would be impracticable to order the 
respondent to give every taxpayer a hearing before he is required to pay the 
duty. A similar finding was that in the case Henbase 3392 (Pty) Ltd v CSARS 
64 SATC 203. This case also involved Customs and Excise. It would seem that 
the Customs and Excise officials are given more slack, perhaps because of the 
nature of their work. The audi alteram partem principle has essentially been 
legislated for in the PAJA. This provides for fair administrative justice which 
can include a hearing for the review of a decision. 
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CHAPTER TWELVE 
Practical Problems Facing Taxpayers 
12.1 Time 
The Revenue Acts do not compel the Commissioner in any of its provisions to 
carry out any of his duties in a specific time. The one exception to this is the 
recently introduced alternative dispute resolution procedures and the 
amended objection and appeal procedures. Thus, the Commissioner may take 
as long as he wishes to, for example, issue an assessment, reply to a query 
from a taxpayer or issue a refund, which may fall within his discretion. 
These actions, the decision and the exercise of discretion, are reviewable in 
terms of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act. The Service Monitoring 
Office which was introduced recently is the correct forum to deal with this 
problem. 
12.2 Lack of Finance 
Lack of finance is a real problem for taxpayers who find themselves at the 
mercy of the resources of SARS. Admittedly, the initial objection and appeal 
processes are reasonably cost effective and the taxpayer can represent 
himself, particularly where the ADR process is followed. However, when the 
formal court process is required, the expense is beyond the resources of the 
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majority of people of South Africa. The cost of hiring an attorney and an 
advocate and bringing an application before the High Court could cost as 
much as R 50 000 or even more. It is also true that, in certain circumstances, 
legal aid may be available. If an appeal is to proceed to the Supreme Court of 
Appeal or even the Constitutional Court this would result in significantly 
higher costs for the applicant. If the applicant's constitutional rights had been 
infringed and he was not able to approach that court because of a lack of 
finance it would surely mean that he had no recourse. On the side of the 
Commissioner, he has at his disposal advocates and staff as well as finances 
to fight any challenge. It would appear that this is an unfair advantage and 
perhaps is a stumbling block to the protection of constitutional rights of 
individuals. 
12.3 Unskilled Tax Advisors 
It would seem that taxpayers may be treading in a minefield when they 
appoint a person to attend to their tax affairs. At present there is no standard 
against which to measure the competency of a tax advisor. There is no 
requirement for a minimum qualification nor experience. Accountants who 
belong to any of the recognized accounting bodies are normally required to 
have a minimum qualification and a level of experience. But that relates 
essentially to accountancy and in the case of audit companies, auditing. Any 
person can act as a tax advisor to any other person without having any 
knowledge of tax law or tax cases or to have any formal training in tax at all. 
In an article written by G. Goldswain on the subject of what he terms 
"advisor's necessary equipment" he states the following on page 33: 
"Unless an entry-level advisor has what I call, for the want of a better word, 
a 'feeling' for taxation, he will not, in my opinion, make a good tax advisor. 
In fact, I could go so far as to say that he would never be able to progress to 
a tax 'specialist' without his 'feeling' for taxation. One way to achieve this 
'feeling' is to be aware of the concept of tax cases and the part they play in 
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the interpretation of tax legislation. A thorough knowledge and understanding 
of the principles discussed in the cases, together with the legislation, is a 
prerequisite for effective tax planning." On page 34 he states : 
" In my opinion, I find it quite unacceptable that a tax advisor can be let loose 
on the unsuspecting public without knowing these, what I would term, entry-
level principles, yet be expected to know a specific case on a subject which I 
would term specialised." 
SARS has taken the first steps towards providing a possible solution to this 
problem by proposing an association of tax practitioners where tax advisors 
will be required to have a level of qualification and or experience before they 
can practise as such. 
C. Divaris, in his article "Dogs bark", expresses a critical view of such an 
association on page 143: 
" On the point (and on no other) that tax advisors are generally either crooks 
or incompetents, I agree with the Commissioner, although I think that his 
campaign to register tax practitioners is both unworkable and silly. As a 
famous educator once taught me, you cannot legislate for morals. (For 
confirmation, ask our professional societies, if you can catch them in a waking 
moment)." 
On the other side, since tax advisors will be required, in the future, to have a 
certain standard of experience and qualification, it would only be fair to 
require that the employees of SARS directly involved with issuing assessments 
should also have a certain level of competency, whether academic or 




In this study we have considered the question of whether the taxpayer in 
South Africa is protected by the Constitution or any other law. We have found 
that the ability of SARS to become more intrusive into the lives of every 
person has increased significantly. More importantly, we have noted instances 
where the power and authority has been used arbitrarily and without 
consideration for the rights of people. It has been pointed out by the Courts 
on occasion that there are times when the infringement of the rights of 
people can be justified. However, the new Constitution and the Constitutional 
Court which interpret it, protects the rights of all people and will not allow 
abuse of power and arbitrary decisions that negatively impact on people's 
rights to go unchecked. Certain legislation has been promulgated to beef up 
the watchdog ability of the Court. SARS has to exercise much greater care 
and diligence in their dealings with taxpayers because the very power that 
they wield could also be their greatest threat. Some tax experts may express 
dismay at the large majority of Constitutional Court decisions that have gone 
against the declaring of certain revenue provisions unconstitutional. However, 
as J Silke crisply puts it in the title of his article on the subject: "When will 
they ever learn ? " The Constitution is there to provide protection for the 
rights of people who obey the law and, where a law is unjustifiable, to strike 
it down. It is not there to be abused by delaying tactics. Apart from the 
Constitution there is ample legislation that will protect the rights of people. 
There is always room for an organ of state to improve and SARS is no 
exception. While much has been done, much still remains to be done to rid it 
of the legacy of inefficiency that has always dogged it. 
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